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“Ideals without technique are a mess. But technique without ideals is a
1
menace.”
—Karl Llewellyn
It has been repeatedly concluded over many decades that legal education fails
2
to adequately train students for the practice of law. The educational critique
gained vigor in 2007 when the Carnegie Foundation published its study of the
professional training of lawyers, concluding that legal education focused too
heavily on teaching the cognitive analysis of legal doctrine and not enough on
3
teaching practical skills and professional values. On the heels of the economic
downturn, a new line of criticism of legal education has emerged, which takes
law schools to task for imposing the soaring costs of legal education on law
4
students graduating into a contracting market for legal services. With declining
student enrollments and greater competition among law schools for applicants,
the mandate to lower costs is no longer just a moral imperative for many law
5
schools—reductions in tuition revenue make cost-cutting an inescapable reality.
These critiques of legal education push law schools toward two seemingly
contradictory goals: (1) provide more practical training to a greater number of
students and (2) lower operational costs. This Article is for those who have a
sincere desire to do both. It is based on the premise that the educational critique
repeated over decades is correct: legal education needs to deliver better education
across a broader spectrum of essential lawyering skills and values. However, it
accepts the economic reality that law schools cannot achieve this goal by simply
grafting additional low-enrollment experiential courses onto the existing law
school curriculum and hoping that students will select them in a largely
unstructured upper-level curriculum. Instead, the basic program of legal
education needs to be restructured to move students in an orderly way through
the acquisition of basic legal knowledge, essential lawyering skills, and
underlying professional values.

1. Karl Llewellyn, On What’s Wrong with So-Called Legal Education, 35 COLUM. L. REV. 651, 662
(1935).
2. For a comprehensive review of the history of such critiques of legal education going back to the end of
the nineteenth century, see A. Benjamin Spencer, The Law School Critique in Historical Perspective, 69 WASH.
& LEE L. REV. 1949, 1982–2015 (2012).
3. WILLIAM M. SULLIVAN, ET AL., EDUCATING LAWYERS: PREPARATION FOR THE PRACTICE OF LAW 74–
84 (2007) [hereinafter CARNEGIE REPORT]. The same year, the Clinical Legal Education Association released a
volume describing the best practices for planning and implementing a well-rounded program of legal education.
ROY STUCKEY ET AL., BEST PRACTICES FOR LEGAL EDUCATION (2007) [hereinafter BEST PRACTICES REPORT].
4. BRIAN Z. TAMANAHA, THE CRISIS IN LEGAL EDUCATION 18–19 (John M. Conley & Lynn Mather eds.,
2011) (discussing the high costs imposed as a result of accreditation); Brent E. Newton, The Ninety-Five
Theses: Systemic Reforms of American Legal Education and Licensure, 64 S. C. L. REV. 55, 59–60 (2012);
Spencer, supra note 2, at 1951–56.
5. Todd Petys, The Analytic Classroom, 60 BUFF. L. REV. 1255, 1256–58 (2012).
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Although this Article will offer concrete suggestions for both a substantially
restructured program of legal education and a menu of suggestions for more
immediate and low-cost options, it will first address the mental and psychological
barriers to reform—the mistakes in thinking—that keep law faculties from
implementing change. At the deepest level of these mental barriers is a basic
6
myth: professional education can meaningfully separate theory from practice.
This myth divides law school education into a series of dichotomies. It views the
traditional case method of instruction in legal education as teaching “doctrine”
and lumps together all other kinds of instruction—legal writing, simulations,
clinics, and externships—as teaching “skills.” It aligns the teaching of doctrine
7
with theory and the teaching of skills with practice. It divides responsibility for
the law school curriculum, significantly outsourcing lawyering skills instruction
to adjunct professors or assigning it to faculty members in job statuses that give
8
them less power and authority in faculty governance. The imbalance in faculty
governance perpetuates the imbalance in instruction by keeping curricular
decision-making in the hands of traditional classroom teachers.
Part I of this Article challenges the dichotomy between theory and practice. It
demonstrates that what is traditionally thought of as “doctrinal” instruction
regularly sacrifices breadth of doctrinal knowledge in favor of a particular kind
of skills training: the ability to analyze appellate cases, to extract and synthesize
9
their underlying principles, and to apply these principles to new situations.
However, instruction based on traditional casebooks also has structural
limitations as skills training: (1) it provides students with a closed and artificial
universe of legal authority that neither captures the breadth of substantive law
they will need as practitioners nor gives them practice in finding the law they will
need to know; (2) it fails to contextualize legal analysis and reasoning within the
larger framework of the lawyering process, which includes problem-solving and
advocating for clients based on their unique circumstances and operating in the
context of unstructured facts; and (3) it overlooks the forward-looking analysis
associated with transactional lawyering. Once the traditional case method
instruction is revealed as a kind of skills training, the foregone opportunities to
10
create more balanced coverage of skills instruction in law school become clear.
Part II of this Article examines the characteristics of integration,
collaboration, and progression that represent a well-balanced law school
curriculum. Like well-executed Socratic classroom instruction, other lawyering
skills, such as client interviewing, client counseling, fact development,

6. See generally Mark Spiegel, Theory and Practice in Legal Education: An Essay on Clinical Education,
34 UCLA L. REV. 577 (1987).
7. Id. at 578.
8. Spencer, supra note 2, at 2022–23.
9. See infra Part I.A.
10. Spiegel, supra note 6, at 578.
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negotiation, and persuasion, have underlying analytic frameworks that explain
processes of behavior that seem intuitive to experts who have internalized them.
By making these underlying frameworks explicit, instructors in other skills
courses can use them to step students through the lawyering processes of
analyzing facts, understanding their clients’ interests and positions, and artfully
11
persuading others. The breakdown between theory and practice erodes the
justification for an “outsourcing” model of legal education, in which law school
faculty primarily concern themselves with teaching the theory and analysis of
appellate cases, and view “other skills” as belonging outside the realm of the
12
legal academy. Additionally, it helps define a greater faculty role in skills
instruction, and suggests a different division of responsibility and opportunities
for collaboration between the legal academy and the practicing bar in developing
13
a well-rounded program of professional instruction.
Part III addresses two major barriers to reform in legal education: (1) the
specter of bar examination, which motivates student demand for bar instruction
and drives faculties to offer case method instruction in core bar courses; and (2)
concerns about the costs of experiential education, which make it difficult to
balance instruction in legal education by simply adding more experiential
14
courses. Part III proposes both structural changes to the legal education and a
menu of alternative strategies for delivering skills instruction by redeploying
existing resources within law schools and realigning the partnerships between the
15
legal academy and the practicing bar.
I. THE CASEBOOK METHOD OF INSTRUCTION
This Part explores both the benefits and the shortcomings of the casebook
method of instruction. The appellate case method in legal education was
originally designed as an interactive instructional method for uncovering and
16
synthesizing the organizing principles that underlie substantive doctrinal law.
However, its lasting value has been secured by a different feature: its facility in
instilling the habits of mind that characterize a distinctively lawyer-like mode of
analysis and reasoning. In short, the case dialogue method of instruction is
valuable as a form of professional skills training.
Yet, viewed as skills training, the case method of instruction can take
students only a limited distance toward becoming competent, entry-level
professionals because its structure limits the ability to develop a broad range of
11. See infra Part II.A.
12. See infra Part II.B.
13. See infra Part II.C–D.
14. See infra Part III.A.
15. See infra Part III.B.
16. See Spiegel, Theory and Practice in Legal Education: An Essay on Clinical Education, 34 UCLA L.
REV. 577, 581 (1987).
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lawyering skills. Moreover, its inefficiency limits its usefulness in teaching
either the breadth of substantive doctrinal law a practicing lawyer needs to know,
or the research skills lawyers use to find the law that is relevant in their practice.
A. What the Appellate Case Method Accomplishes
As originally conceived by Christopher Columbus Langdell, the appellate
case method was a method of teaching the substantive law that practicing lawyers
18
needed to know. At the heart of Langdell’s pedagogy was a formalist
conception of law as a system of finite, neutral, and consistent principles, which
could be extracted from the study of appellate cases and used to logically derive
19
correct results in future cases. Langdell sometimes analogized the study of law
20
to the study of natural science. In this view, appellate cases are like specimens
that can be examined to reveal fundamental legal doctrines, which could then be
“so classified and arranged that each should be found in its proper place, and
21
nowhere else. . . .” It followed from this view of the law that the “proper
workshop” for aspiring lawyers was the law library, which Langdell described as
being to the law school what “the laboratories of the university are to the
chemists and physicists, the museum of natural history to the zoologists, [and]
22
the botanical garden to the botanists.” Langdell’s belief in the possibility of
distilling from appellate cases a complete set of principled doctrines, the mastery
of which permitted lawyers to “apply them with constant facility and certainty to
23
the ever-tangled skein of human affairs,” justified the appellate casebook
24
method as the study of substantive doctrinal law.
The formalist jurisprudence that justified the Langdellian case method
quickly buckled under critique, captured most aptly by Oliver Wendell Holmes’s
25
aphorism that “the life of the law has not been logic: it has been experience.”
Following Holmes, thinkers aligned with American Legal Realism insisted that
judges decide cases, not on the basis of logical deduction, but based on the

17. See infra Part I.B.
18. ROBERT STEVENS, LAW SCHOOL: LEGAL EDUCATION IN AMERICA FROM THE 1850S TO THE 1980S 53
(1983).
19. Id. at 53–54; Thomas C. Grey, Langdell’s Orthodoxy, 45 U. PITT. L. REV. 1, 11 (1983).
20. WILLIAM TWINING, KARL LLEWELLYN AND THE REALIST MOVEMENT 11–13 (1973).
21. Grey, supra note 19, at 13 (quoting CHRISTOPHER COLUMBUS LANGDELL, A SELECTION OF CASES ON
THE LAW OF CONTRACTS (2d ed. 1879)).
22. Christopher Columbus Langdell, Harvard Celebration Speeches, 3 LAW QUARTERLY REV. 123, 124
(1887).
23. Grey, supra note 19, at 13 (quoting CHRISTOPHER COLUMBUS LANGDELL, A SELECTION OF CASES ON
THE LAW OF CONTRACTS (2d ed. 1879)).
24. Id. at 11–12.
25. OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR. THE COMMON LAW 1 (1881). See also Oliver Wendell Holmes, The
Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 465 (1897).

11

01_KRUSE_VER_01_6-18-13_FINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

1/31/2014 9:52 AM

2013 / Myths and Misconceptions About Theory and Practice
26

judges’ senses of the factual situations and their ideas about good public policy.
According to this critique, legal rules and principles do not dictate and may not
even determine judicial decisions; rather, judges use legal reasoning to justify the
27
results they intuitively or pragmatically want to reach. Realist critics shared
Langdell’s premise that the most central task for lawyers was prediction of how
28
judges would decide cases. However, realists insisted that to learn this skill one
must study, not the reasoning used to justify decisions, but the behavior of judges
29
and the patterns of judicial decision making.
Despite the effective dismantling of legal doctrine’s pretentions to systemic
completeness and logical determinacy, the appellate case method of instruction
30
continues to thrive. Why, one might wonder, would such a thoroughly
discredited jurisprudence continue to drive what the Carnegie Foundation
31
characterized as the “signature pedagogy” of legal education? The answer is
that the case method thrives, not because it teaches legal doctrine especially
effectively, but because it imparts an essential set of foundational lawyering
32
skills.
The importance of the case analysis and legal argumentation skills can be
explained jurisprudentially as well. As future participants in the legal system, law
students need to learn to incorporate what H.L.A. Hart called an “internal point
33
of view” of the law, which views rules of law as the source of reasons for action
even as they acknowledge that the development of law may be influenced by
34
external factors. By studying the law from an external perspective, as the Legal
Realists did, you can understand, for example, that federal judges appointed by a
Democratic president are statistically more likely to rule in favor of civil rights
plaintiffs, and that this tendency is amplified if they sit on a panel with other
26. Brian Lieter calls this the “Core Claim” of Legal Realism. Brian Leiter, Rethinking Legal Realism:
Toward a Naturalized Jurisprudence, 76 TEX. L. REV. 267, 275–76 (1997).
27. Karl Llewellyn, Some Realism about Legal Realism—Responding to Dean Pound, 44 HARV. L. REV.
1222, 1236–42 (1931); Joseph C. Hucheson, Jr., The Judgment Intuitive: The Function of the “Hunch” in
Judicial Decision, 14 CORNELL L. Q. 274 (1928).
28. See e.g., HOLMES, The Path of Law, supra note 25, at 457.
29. JEROME FRANK, LAW AND THE MODERN MIND x–xi (1930).
30. Gary Shaw, A Heretical View of Teaching: A Contrarian Looks at Teaching, the Carnegie Report,
and Best Practices, 28 TOURO L. REV. 1239, 1259–62 (2012).
31. CARNEGIE REPORT, supra note 3, at 23–24.
32. Shaw, supra note 30.
33. H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 134–47 (1961).
34. Legal Realism shares an external, behavioral perspective on law with its more recent academic
progeny, the Law and Economics, Critical Legal Studies, and Law and Society movements, all of which view
the influence of external forces studied in the social sciences on law. Gary Minda, The Jurisprudential
Movements of the 1980s, 50 OHIO ST. L.J. 599, 632–38 (1989) (discussing Critical Legal Studies, Law, and
Economics and feminist legal theory); Anthony Kronman, Jurisprudential Responses to Legal Realism, 73
CORNELL L. REV. 335, 335–40 (1988) (discussing Critical Legal Studies and Law and Economics as responses
to Legal Realism); see generally Stewart Macaulay, The New Versus the Old Legal Realism: “Things Ain’t
What They Used to Be” 2005 WIS. L. REV. 365 (discussing the roots of the Law and Society movement in Legal
Realism).
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judges appointed by Democratic presidents. But, you cannot argue to a federal
judge that her appointment by a Democratic president is a reason for her to rule
in favor of your client. Although lawyers’ advocacy may be informed by
understanding the external economic and political dynamics of law’s
development and implementation, at the end of the day, legal arguments are
crafted in terms of the authority of legal rules and consistency with underlying
36
principles.
The appellate case method has pedagogical benefits that go beyond
developing law students’ capacity to read cases and formulate legal arguments,
the most celebrated of which is its facility in teaching law students the deep
37
structure of “thinking like lawyers.” As the recent Carnegie study of
professional legal education noted, the repeated parsing of appellate cases in
first-year law school classes teaches students to think in a distinctly legal way
about the material at hand, honing in on legally relevant facts with “both
38
precision and generality.” The professor-student dialogue that characterizes the
case method continually shifts the facts or points of view from which students
view the facts, demonstrating how different facts would strengthen or weaken
39
different legal arguments. The resultant ability to sort and categorize facts
according to generalized elements of legal doctrine—to “spot legal issues”—is
part of the deep structure of legal professionalism, defined by the American Bar
Association as the “most fundamental legal skill” comprising competence to
40
practice law.
The lasting value in the case dialogue method thus lies in its facility as a
particular kind of skills instruction; along with teaching foundational legal
doctrine, it effectively hones the skills of legal analysis and argument and
41
develops characteristically lawyer-like habits of thinking. However, once these
skills are imparted, its value diminishes, as does students’ engagement in the
learning process, which falls off dramatically during the second and third years
42
of repetitive case method instruction. The next Section turns to the legal

35. See Thomas J. Miles & Cass R. Sunstein, The New Legal Realism, 75 U. CHI. L. REV. 831, 838–39
(2008) (summarizing the work of “New Legal Realists” on demographic factors influencing judicial decision
making).
36. See Todd D. Rakoff & Martha Minow, A Case for Another Case Method, 60 VAND. L. REV. 597, 599
(2007) (explaining the verisimilitude of the case method in relation to practice as a reason why it has survived
the Realist critique of “law as science”).
37. This shift in emphasis came early in the twentieth century. Spiegel, supra note 6, at 582–83.
38. CARNEGIE REPORT, supra note 3, at 54–55.
39. Id. at 64–66.
40. ABA MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT, R. 1.1, cmt. 2 (“Perhaps the most fundamental legal skill
consists of determining what kind of legal problems a situation may involve, a skill that necessarily transcends
any particular specialized knowledge.”).
41. Petys, supra note 5, at 1284–91 (citing longitudinal empirical studies concluding that law students’
legal analysis improves over the second or third year of law school).
42. Id. at 1270-71; Spencer, supra note 2, at 2034-35. But see Shaw, supra note 30, at 1291–93 (arguing
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knowledge, lawyering skills, and analytic frameworks that the case dialogue
method misses—subjects that should form the basis for the law school
curriculum beyond the first year of law school.
B. What Case Method Instruction Misses
As effective as the case dialogue method is in teaching the deep structure of
“thinking like a lawyer,” the repetitive focus on analysis of appellate cases
through three years of law school leaves much to be desired. As a method of
teaching substantive law, it is both inefficient and incomplete: the absence of
actual clients and factual context under-develops client problem-solving and
advocacy skills, and the litigation context of disputes in appellate cases fails to
capture the analytic frameworks for using the law in transactional contexts.
1. Inadequacy in Teaching Substantive Law
Perhaps the most surprising shortcoming of the case dialogue is its
inadequacy in covering the basic substantive law that practicing lawyers need to
43
know. Although this criticism may seem novel in an age when the focus of
criticism of the case method is its failure to teach a breadth of lawyering skills,
the criticism is not new. The 1928 Reed Report noted that, in comparison to the
lecture method, the case dialogue method “is so onerous, demanding as it does
perhaps twice as much time . . . that it increases the probability that the student
will have to omit branches of law, acquaintance with which would be of value to
44
him in his future practice.” In the mid-1940s, Karl Llewellyn similarly decried
the case method’s futile attempt at broad subject-matter coverage, arguing that
“man could hardly devise a more wasteful method” of imparting knowledge
45
about the law.” And, as some have noted, the reality of classroom teaching
today reflects a significant trend toward ramping up subject-matter coverage in
46
upper-level courses.
However, attempting meaningful subject-matter coverage with traditional
casebook materials is fraught with inherent problems that cannot be solved by
moving more quickly through the material provided in a casebook. One of the
problems is the sheer volume of material that practicing lawyers need to know,
which cannot effectively be collected in a single edited volume. However, there
for a continuing but diminished role of Socratic method in the second and third years).
43. Id. at 1267–69.
44. ALFRED Z. REED, TRAINING FOR THE PUBLIC PROFESSION OF THE LAW 223 (1921).
45. Karl L. Llewellyn, The Current Crisis in Legal Education, 1 J. LEGAL EDUC. 211, 215 (1948).
Llewellyn’s views shaped the 1944 report of the Committee on Curriculum of the Association of American Law
Schools, published as The Place of Skills in Legal Education, 45 COLUM. L. REV. 345 (1945) [hereinafter
LLEWELLYN REPORT].
46. Petys, supra note 5, at 1272–73.
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are also deeper structural problems with the casebook format. For example, by
providing students with carefully excerpted cases gathered together in a single
volume, the case method actively discourages students from developing the
47
research skills necessary to find relevant law for themselves. The focus on
extracting legal principles from cases also gives short shrift to developing the
analytical skills needed to read and understand the law in fields dominated by
statutes and administrative regulations. The need to create casebooks for a
national market distorts instruction in areas dominated by state and local law by
collecting exemplary cases from diverse jurisdictions rather than teaching the
interplay between statutory, administrative, and case law in a single jurisdiction.
The instruction in a typical Criminal Law class illustrates some of these
shortcomings. The heart of legal research and analysis in criminal practice begins
with state and local statutes, yet Criminal Law casebooks largely ignore in-depth
coverage of any particular jurisdiction in favor of collections of appellate cases
drawn from diverse jurisdictions. To help teach the importance of statutory
analysis, Criminal Law textbooks sometimes utilize the Model Penal Code.
However, unlike uniform laws or model rules in other areas, the influence of the
48
Model Penal Code is largely historical; state criminal codes have never closely
tracked the language in the Model Penal Code even in areas like the definition of
49
mens rea, where the Model Penal Code has been especially influential.
Moreover, the basic outline of doctrinal coverage in Criminal Law is imbalanced
when compared to the substantive law that lawyers in practice need to know.
Students may spend an entire Criminal Law class discussing the idiosyncratic
question of whether a defendant can be held criminally responsible for actions
taken while sleepwalking, but never touch on common issues that routinely arise
in criminal law practice, such as whether a defendant legally possesses illegal
drugs found underneath the passenger’s seat of the car he is driving.
Law schools typically offer Criminal Law as a first-year course, and its
lapses in substantive coverage can be forgiven in light of the indirect benefit
students derive from using Criminal Law casebook materials as fodder for
learning how to think like lawyers. Gathering a sampling of cases together in one
volume makes sense when the primary purpose is to teach students how to read
and analyze appellate cases. Studying the Model Penal Code can provide
additional practice in the transferable analytical skill of deriving elements from
statutory language. And the focus on exotic examples, like sleepwalking

47. See id.
48. Sanford H. Kadish, Fifty Years of Criminal Law: An Opinionated Review, 87 CAL. L. REV. 943, 947–
53 (1999) (describing the main influences of the Model Penal Code as stimulating jurisdictions to codify their
criminal law, re-orienting scholarship from common law to legislative perspectives on criminal law, and
clarifying the principles of mens rea).
49. See generally Dannye Holley, The Influence of the Model Penal Code’s Culpability Provisions on
State Legislatures: A Study of Lost Opportunities, Including Abolishing the Mistake of Fact Doctrine, 27 SW. U.
L. REV. 229 (1997) (surveying adoption of the mens rea requirements in twenty-two states).
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defendants, helps illustrate basic underlying principles, such as the requirement
that criminal liability requires a voluntary act. However, once students master the
skills associated with legal analysis and reasoning and move on to upper-level
courses, the time-consuming process of extracting law and slowly identifying
underlying principles through the give-and-take of appellate case dialogue
50
becomes increasingly difficult to defend.
2. The Missing Context of the Lawyering Process: Clients and Facts
In 1969, Chief Justice Warren Burger said that “[t]he shortcomings of
today’s law graduate lies not in a decent knowledge of the law but that he has
little, if any, training in dealing with facts or people—the stuff of which cases are
51
really made.” Although the skills of legal analysis, reasoning, and argument are
unquestionably important, they are embedded within a much broader lawyering
process, which extends from the moment a client walks through the door for an
52
initial consultation through the resolution of the client’s case. The lawyering
process requires a range of essential skills beyond legal analysis and reasoning,
including client interviewing and counseling, persuasive factual analysis,
53
negotiation, and advocacy. The appellate case method suffers significant
structural deficiencies as a platform for teaching these other lawyering skills
because the study of appellate cases lacks two important elements: (1) experience
with the way legal issues arise in the context of the clients’ non-legal interests
and objectives, and (2) experience with indeterminate factual situations that
require investigation and development of facts.
a. Client Problem-Solving
As the Carnegie Report points out, one of the most glaring elements missing
54
from the case dialogue method is experience with clients. Ann Shalleck has
elaborated on this point, arguing that in typical law school classrooms, clients
55
appear as “cardboard figures” removed from the social contexts that gave rise to
their cases and severed from the web of relationships within which their disputes
50. Spencer, supra note 2, at 2034–35 (discussing the declining benefit of case method in upper years).
51. William P. Quigley, Introduction to Clinical Teaching for the New Clinical Law Professor: A View
from the First Floor, 28 AKRON L. REV. 463, 469–70 (1995) (quoting Chief Justice Warren Burger, Address
Before the ABA Convention Prayer Breakfast (Aug. 10, 1969)).
52. The particular description of the lawyering process contemplates a dispute resolution context. The
casebook method also has deficiencies with respect to representation of clients in the transactional planning
context, which will be considered infra Part I.B.3.
53. STEFAN H. KRIEGER, ET AL., ESSENTIAL LAWYERING SKILLS: INTERVIEWING, COUNSELING,
NEGOTIATION AND PERSUASIVE FACT ANALYSIS 3–4 (4th ed. 2011).
54. CARNEGIE REPORT, supra note 3, at 57.
55. Ann Shalleck, Constructions of the Client Within Legal Education, 45 STAN. L. REV. 1731, 1735
(1993).
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arose. Clients appear in the case dialogue—if at all—as nominal placeholders
for legal arguments: “If you represented the plaintiff [in this case], what would
57
you argue in support of this rule?” Such questions ask students to imagine how
they would serve the interests of hypothetical clients who presumably want to
win, as winning is conventionally defined, without any thought as to how the
clients’ actual motivations, commitments, relationships, or the costs of litigation,
58
might affect the decisions of real-life clients.
If left uncorrected, this oversimplification of clients’ objectives can lead to
deeper problems of legal professionalism. In 1975, philosopher and early legal
ethicist Richard Wasserstrom noted that professionals have a tendency to view a
client or a patient “not as a whole person but as a segment or aspect of a
person—an interesting kidney problem, a routine marijuana possession case, or
59
another adolescent with an identity crisis.” This “legal objectification” of clients
can result in problematic lawyer-client relationships, in which lawyers represent,
not the actual clients before them, but standardized clients that the lawyers have
60
constructed out of the legal interests the lawyers have imputed to them.
Wasserstrom’s concern that lawyers’ professionalized view of clients might
create a mismatch between what clients actually want and what lawyers pursue
61
for them bears out in empirical studies of the legal profession. Sometimes, the
mismatch is a result of the law’s failure to provide a remedy for a client’s
grievance, such as when divorce clients want to assign blame for the break-up of
marriage in no-fault divorce systems that do not require parties to establish blame
62
as a condition of getting a divorce. In other instances, lawyers overestimate the
importance of financial outcomes to clients when compared with other nonmonetary objectives, such as the importance to medical malpractice plaintiffs of
63
acceptance of responsibility, prevention of reoccurrence, answers, and apology.
In either case, lawyers’ professionalized view of their clients’ problems is shaped
by the lens of legal issue-spotting that they bring to a client’s situation, which
56. Id. at 1733.
57. Id. at 1735.
58. Id. at 1736. See also MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT, R. 1.2, cmt. [2] (“[L]awyers usually defer
to the client regarding such questions as the expense to be incurred and concern for third persons who might be
adversely affected.”).
59. Richard Wasserstrom, Lawyers as Professionals: Some Moral Issues, 5 HUM. RTS. 1, 21 (1975).
60. William H. Simon, The Ideology of Advocacy, 1978 WIS. L. REV. 29, 55 (1978); Warren Lehman, The
Pursuit of A Client’s Interests 77 MICH. L. REV. 1078, 1087–88 (1979).
61. See e.g., AUSTIN SARAT & WILLIAM L. F. FELSTINER, DIVORCE LAWYERS AND THEIR CLIENTS:
POWER AND MEANING IN THE LEGAL PROCESS 142–53 (1995) (studying client interactions with divorce
lawyers); Tamara Relis, “It’s Not About the Money!”: A Theory on Misconceptions of Plaintiffs’ Litigation
Aims, 68 U. PITT. L. REV. 701 (2007) (surveying medical malpractice lawyers and clients); Lynn Mather, What
Do Clients Want? What Do Lawyers Do?, 52 EMORY L.J. 1065, 1071–81 (2003) (surveying empirical research
on lawyer-client relationships of criminal defense, divorce, personal injury, property and civil rights, and
corporate lawyers).
62. SARAT & FELSTINER, supra note 61, at 37.
63. Relis, supra note 61, at 346.
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may not accurately capture the non-legal issues that predominate the clients’
64
view of the problem or situation.
By staying within the realm of hypothetical clients and their imagined
objectives, the casebook method of legal instruction does little to prepare law
students to ascertain a client’s multidimensional and sometimes shifting
objectives. Nor does the method prepare them to advocate for and advise clients
65
whose legal issues are intertwined with an array of non-legal concerns.
b. Facts, Factual Investigation, and Persuasive Storytelling
Another major area of activity and concern for practicing lawyers is the
66
analysis and development of facts. The statements of facts in appellate opinions
consist of only a few facts drawn from the record of a lower court, selected and
presented to lend rhetorical support to the legal conclusion that the author of the
67
appellate opinion has drawn. Traditional law school examinations mirror this
process: students are provided with a short statement of fixed and predetermined
facts and evaluated on how well they spot and analyze the legal issues raised by
those facts.
In the practice of law, by contrast, lawyers must develop facts through
investigation and discovery. Lawyers often begin with a preliminary legal theory
that puts the client’s version of facts into existing structures of legal claims and
68
defenses. But this preliminary analysis is only the beginning of the process.
Lawyers must go on to analyze the factual propositions that might establish such
legal claims or defenses; the documents or witnesses that might exist to
substantiate, contradict, bolster or undermine those factual propositions; and the
tools of investigation and discovery that the lawyer might use to pursue such
69
potential evidence. The process of factual analysis proceeds in the opposite
direction from the process of issue-spotting that professors test repeatedly in
traditional law school examinations. Rather than beginning with a set of fixed
facts and applying the law to them, factual investigation uses the law as a fixed
framework and analyzes how the facts might be developed to meet or frustrate
the establishment of legal claims and defenses.
64. DAVID A. BINDER, ET AL., LAWYERS AS COUNSELORS: A CLIENT-CENTERED APPROACH 2–15 (2d ed.
1991).
65. Katherine R. Kruse, Beyond Cardboard Clients in Legal Ethics, 23 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 103, 132–
34 (2010).
66. Spencer, supra note 2, at 2037–38.
67. John Luebsdorf, The Structure of Legal Opinions, 86 MINN. L. REV. 447 (2001) (describing the
rhetorical choices made in appellate opinions when viewed as stories); Ron Moss, Rhetorical Strategems in
Judicial Opinions, 2 SCRIBE 103, 105–07 (1991).
68. See generally Christopher P. Gilkerson, Poverty Law Narratives: The Critical Practice and Theory of
Receiving and Translating Client Stories, 43 HASTINGS L.J. 861 (1992) (discussing the interaction between
client narratives and universalized legal narratives that constitute legal claims).
69. KRIEGER ET AL., supra note 53, at 149–57.
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Along the way, lawyers are likely to confront the factual ambiguity and
conflict caused by imperfect recollection, omission, and conscious or
70
unconscious shaping of reality to align with self-interest. Rather than passively
accepting “the facts” presented to them, lawyers must examine witnesses’
possible motives, read between the lines of documents, and test different versions
of the facts for their consistency with other facts, their plausibility compared to
how people would be expected to behave, and how well they account for contrary
71
facts that undermine them. As Jerome Frank once wrote, at the trial court level,
judicial fact-finding is, in the end, a judge’s “subjective, fallible reaction to the
72
subjective, fallible reactions of the witnesses to the actual, objective facts.” In
developing cases, lawyers must learn how to maneuver within the realm of
deeply subjective and shifting factual uncertainty.
Factual analysis involves more than just analyzing how facts fit within the
frameworks formed by the legal elements of claims and defenses. To be effective
advocates, lawyers also need to know how to weave facts and inferences into
73
persuasive stories. As Justice Souter aptly noted in Old Chief v. United States,
74
“a syllogism is not a story.” When evidence is presented in narrative form, it has
persuasive force “with power not only to support conclusions but to sustain the
willingness of jurors to draw the inferences . . . necessary to reach an honest
75
verdict.” Stories are powerful because of their emotional appeal, identified in
76
Aristotle’s classical study of rhetoric as pathos. Stories invite their listeners to
enter the viewpoint of the characters and empathize with their perspective on
77
events, moving us “to care, and hence pave the way to action.” Storytelling is
also powerful because narrative “corresponds more closely to the manner in
which the human mind makes sense of experience than does the conventional,

70. Jean Sternlight & Jennifer Robbennalt, Good Lawyers Should Be Good Psychologists: Insights for
Interviewing and Counseling Clients, 23 OHIO ST. J. DISPUTE RESOL. 437, 448–86 (2008) (surveying the
psychological aspects of information-processing, memory, and cognitive heuristic biases that prevent people
from conveying and gathering accurate information).
71. Edward D. Ohlbaum, Basic Instinct: Case Theory and Courtroom Performance, 66 TEMPLE L. REV.
1, 18–23 (1993) (listing these among other factors that lead to the persuasiveness of a case theory). See also
Naomi Cahn, Inconsistent Stories, 81 GEO. L.J 2475 (1993).
72. Jerome Frank, Say It With Music, 61 HARV. L. REV. 921, 924 (1948).
73. STEVEN LUBET, NOTHING BUT THE TRUTH: WHY TRIAL LAWYERS DON’T, CAN’T, AND SHOULDN’T
HAVE TO TELL THE WHOLE TRUTH 1–6 (2001); Ohlbaum, supra note 71, at 24–25; Binny Miller, Give Them
Back Their Lives: Recognizing Client Narrative in Case Theory, 93 MICH. L. REV. 485 (1994).
74. Old Chief v. United States, 519 U.S. 172, 189 (1997).
75. Id. at 187. See also Toni M. Massaro, Empathy, Legal Storytelling, and The Rule of Law: New Words,
Old Wounds, 87 MICH. L. REV. 2099 (1989).
76. ARISTOTLE, ON RHETORIC 1.2 in ARISTOTLE: ON RHETORIC, A THEORY OF CIVIC DISCOURSE 38–39
(George A. Kennedy, trans. 1991). Aristotle’s distinction between pathos (emotional appeal), logos (logical
appeal), and ethos (appeal based on the character or credibility of the speaker), has been highly influential in the
development of modern rhetorical studies. Id. at ix–x.
77. Massaro, supra note 75, at 2105.
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78

abstracted rhetoric of law.” Effective advocates use narrative structures to
79
construct storylines out of the facts of a case, exhort decision makers to play the
80
narrative role of hero in a story of the quest for justice, and explain the
81
development of the law as a story with a deep narrative structure.
The casebook method of instruction provides only limited opportunities for
students to explore the complexities of factual analysis that will confront them in
practice. The pre-digested statements of facts in appellate cases are the end
products of a long process of factual development, investigation, discovery,
82
analysis, and strategic choices made in advocacy. The casebook method does
not help a student to study a case “from the front” and anticipate how to develop
83
the facts moving forward.
3. The Missing Analytical Frameworks for Teaching Transactional
Planning
A third shortcoming of the casebook method is its limitations in teaching
transactional and other non-litigation law practices, particularly the work of
84
business lawyers. Transactional practice encompasses commercial deal-making,
including deals involving contracts for acquisition of goods, contracts for
85
services, and the creation of multi-party joint ventures. Other non-litigation
business lawyering involves advising clients on internal operations, internal
86
structuring, and compliance with regulatory and tax laws. The role of
transactional lawyers has been defined specifically in terms of the value that
lawyers add to transactions by reducing transaction costs, regulatory costs, and
87
other costs associated with the transaction. More broadly speaking, “the
78. Steven L. Winter, The Cognitive Dimension of the Agon Between Legal Power and Narrative
Meaning, 87 MICH. L. REV. 2225, 2228 (1989).
79. Binny Miller, Teaching Case Theory, 9 CLINICAL L. REV. 293, 297–98 (2002).
80. Anthony G. Amsterdam & Randy Hertz, An Analysis of Closing Arguments to a Jury, 37 N.Y.L. SCH.
L. REV. 55, 64–65 (1992).
81. Linda H. Edwards, Once Upon a Time in Law: Myth, Metaphor, and Authority, 77 TENN. L. REV.
883, 886–90 (2010).
82. Rakoff & Minow, supra note 36, at 601.
83. Llewellyn, supra note 45, at 213–14.
84. Shreya Atrey, O ‘The Damn Good Deal Lawyer’ Where Art Thou?, 13 T.M. COOLEY J. PRAC. &
CLINICAL L. 331, 337–38 (2011).
85. George W. Dent, Jr., Business Lawyers as Enterprise Architects, 64 BUS. LAW. 279, 289–90 (2009).
86. Id. at 297.
87. The seminal work in this area is Ronald J. Gilson, Value Creation by Business Lawyers: Legal Skills
and Asset Pricing, 94 YALE L.J. 239 (1984). He suggested that lawyers add value to a transaction by
functioning as “transaction cost engineers.” Id. at 243. See also Dent, supra note 85 (broadening Gilson’s focus
on the role of lawyers in acquisitions and calling for a broader definition of the business lawyer’s role as an
“enterprise architect”); Steven L. Schwarcz, Explaining the Value of Transactional Lawyering, 12 STAN. J.L.
BUS. & FIN. 486 (2007) (empirically testing Gilson’s hypotheses about how lawyers add value to transactions);
Edward A. Bernstein, Law & Economics and the Structure of Value Adding Contracts: A Contract Lawyer’s
View of the Law & Economics Literature, 74 OR. L. REV. 189, 198–200 (1995) (providing a transactional
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challenge facing a business lawyer is how to manage and allocate risk in the face
88
of uncertainty.”
The conceptual theory underlying the basic skills component of transactional
lawyering—what one author calls the “why you do what you do”—are a
89
relatively recent development in legal education. However, commentators have
noted significant differences between the skills and norms of litigators and
90
transactional lawyers. The litigation context, in which casebook instruction
resides, implicitly teaches students the skills of crafting the law into persuasive
91
legal arguments. The non-litigation context requires different kinds of analyses
92
and application of the law. For example, deal lawyers must be able to translate a
party’s deal into the basic structural building blocks of a contract:
93
representations, warranties, covenants, and conditions precedent. To add value
to a deal, deal lawyers also need to understand the basic categories of non-legal
business considerations that will matter to their clients, such as money
considerations, risk allocation, the location of control in the future, how broadly
or narrowly to draft standards, and terms covering the endgame of the deal
94
relationship. The foundational skills have been said to include the ability to
95
engage in cost-benefit analysis; the ability to identify the recurring structural
96
problems that create transaction costs; and the ability to evaluate risks, structure
97
agreements, negotiate terms, and draft documents.
The casebook method’s focus on appellate cases exposes students to deals
that have gone bad, but does little to expose students to these underlying
structures of analysis that transactional lawyers use to successfully engineer
98
agreements that do not raise later disputes. Even in courses like contracts and
property, where the bulk of the work lawyers do is transactional, the casebook
method focuses on litigated cases, rather than the more common type of business
lawyer’s view on Gilson’s thesis).
88. Robert C. Illig, The Oregon Method: An Alternative Model for Teaching Transactional Law, 59 J.
LEGAL EDUC. 221, 222 (2009).
89. See Atrey, supra note 84, at 340; Victor Fleischer, Deals: Bringing Corporate Transactions Into the
Law School Classroom, 2002 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 475, 479 (2002).
90. Eric J. Gouvin, Teaching Business Lawyering in Law Schools: A Candid Assessment of the
Challenges and Some Suggestions for Moving Ahead, 78 UMKC L. Rev. 429, 431 (2009); Stephen J. Friedman,
Why Can’t Law Students Be More Like Lawyers?, 37 U. TOL. L. REV. 81, 87–88 (2005).
91. See Atrey, supra note 84, at 341; Tina L. Stark, Thinking Like a Deal Lawyer, 54 J. LEGAL EDUC.
223, 223–24 (2004).
92. Stark, supra note 91, at 224.
93. Id. at 225 (claiming that “there is an underlying similarity to all contacts” that applies “not only to a
car purchase agreement and an employment contract agreement, but also to a multibillion-dollar acquisition
agreement, a license agreement, and a construction contract”).
94. Id. at 229–31.
95. Bernstein, supra note 87, at 191.
96. Fleischer, supra note 89, at 482.
97. Id. at 478.
98. Gouvin, supra note 90, at 434 (2009).
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case studies that business schools use to teach their students forward-thinking
99
business judgment. The litigation focus often carries over into the skills
curriculum of law schools, where simulation courses and clinics continue to be
“skewed toward litigation practice and give short shrift to transactional
100
practice.”
Moreover, unlike litigation, where students’ pre-law school
101
understanding is shaped by multiple media images of lawyers in role,
transactional practice has no common cultural reference point, leaving students
preparing for a transactional legal practice with a task akin to “trying to complete
102
a jigsaw puzzle without the benefit of seeing the box.”
Law schools’ failure to teach students to “think like transactional lawyers”
causes newly-minted lawyers to “fumble around and effectively muddle through
103
problems without adding value,” feeding the negative view that many business
104
clients already hold of lawyers. Notably, entry-level lawyers tend to view
contractual provisions as boilerplate language without understanding “the
105
purposes of those provisions and the thinking that underlies them.” Hence, they
“stick too closely to precedents and retain unnecessary or inefficient terms
because they are unfamiliar with the structure of the documents or do not trust
106
their own judgment.” However, if lawyers function merely as draftsmen filling
out pre-existing forms without exercising professional judgment, they fail to add
107
value to a transaction. Even worse, improperly trained business lawyers may
108
“overlawyer” cases, “seeing a problem behind every bush, overcompensating to
109
avoid risk, [and] generating conflict.”
Although business lawyers eventually hone and calibrate their transactional
skills in practice, the lack of preparation in law school leaves them on their own
to “[s]omehow, in the midst of fourteen-hour days . . . take a step back and think
about how the current transaction differs from the last and why that might be so,

99. Dent, supra note 85, at 319; Celeste M. Hammond, Borrowing from the B Schools: The Legal Case
Study as Course Materials for Transaction Oriented Elective Courses: A Response to the Challenges of the
MacCrate Report and the Carnegie Foundation for Advancement of Teaching Report on Legal Education, 11
TRANSACTIONS: TENN. J. BUS. L. 9, 12–13 (2009).
100. Gouvin, supra note 90, at 430.
101. Illig, supra note 88, at 225.
102. Id. at 221.
103. Gouvin, supra note 90, at 452.
104. Gilson, supra note 87, at 241–42 (clients see business lawyers “at best as a transaction cost, part of a
system of wealth redistribution from clients to lawyers”).
105. Friedman, supra note 90, at 89.
106. Fleischer, supra note 89, at 483.
107. Id. at 479; Schwarcz, supra note 87, at 501 (finding based on empirical research that “transactional
counsel reduce regulatory costs, and thus add value, primarily by performing transaction-regulatory legal work:
by providing expertise in the law and regulations that generally govern the transaction and by understanding the
rationale for the contractual provisions in the transaction documents).
108. Bernstein, supra note 87, at 191, 193.
109. Dent, supra note 85, at 311 (quoting JAMES C. FREUND, SMART NEGOTIATING: HOW TO MAKE
GOOD DEALS IN THE REAL WORLD 186 (1992)).
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and then carry the lesson forward to the next transaction.” Law school
instruction could do more to help law students prepare for the transactional and
business side of lawyering by developing pedagogical methods and delivering
instruction that exposes law students to the analytical constructs they will need to
plan, structure, and problem-solve in non-litigation settings.
As this Part has explained, the lasting value of the appellate case dialogue
method lies not in its efficiency in teaching substantive law, but in its facility in
imparting a foundational set of lawyering skills and habits of thinking. To deliver
a well-rounded professional education, law schools need not abandon the
appellate case dialogue method of instruction, but they must be willing to move
beyond it. The next Part explores in more detail the features of a well-balanced
law school curriculum.
II. TOWARD A WELL-BALANCED LAW SCHOOL CURRICULUM
To transcend the limitations of the appellate casebook method, law schools
must strike a better balance among instruction in doctrinal knowledge, instruction
111
in practice skills, and instruction in professional values. Law schools cannot
reasonably achieve this balance by simply adding credit hours of lawyering skills
courses until they are equal in proportion to the credit hours currently allocated to
doctrinal instruction; balance requires an integration of skills and
112
professionalism instruction with doctrinal learning. In addition to being
integrated, a law school curriculum must be progressive, exposing students to a
wider array of lawyering skills in increasingly challenging and less structured
113
settings. Finally, although there is a temptation for traditional law faculty to
“farm out” skills instruction to adjunct professors or isolate it in clinic and
externship courses, a truly balanced curriculum must involve collaboration
114
between the legal academy and the practicing bar. This Part will explain why
the characteristics of integration, progression, and collaboration are so important.
A. A Common Core Pedagogy of Skills Instruction
In 1944, Karl Llewellyn proposed a large-scale reorientation of legal
education around the acquisition of what he called the “craft-skills of the
115
lawyer.” In Llewellyn’s vision, after the first year of law school, instructional
110. Fleischer, supra note 89, at 486.
111. The Carnegie Report calls these the “three apprenticeships of professional education.” CARNEGIE
REPORT, supra note 3, at 27–29.
112. Spencer, supra note 2, at 2025. See also CARNEGIE REPORT, supra note 3, at 194–97; BEST
PRACTICES REPORT, supra note 3, at 97–100.
113. Spencer, supra note 2, at 2025.
114. Id. at 2025–26.
115. Llewellyn, supra note 45, at 216.
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materials should shift from appellate cases to other kinds of materials; and law
schools should select upper-level courses, not based on the importance of their
subject-matter, but based on their suitability in helping students develop a
116
broader range of skills. To achieve a balance of skills, knowledge, and
professionalism, law schools must be willing, like Llewellyn, to rethink the tacit
commitment to subject-matter coverage as the dominant organizing principle of
117
the law school curriculum.
The first step in any such reorientation is recognizing that what we most
often picture as “lawyering skills” instruction shares a common pedagogical
structure with the case dialogue method. It has been well-accepted since at least
the turn of the twentieth century that the case dialogue method inculcates a set of
118
foundational cognitive lawyering skills. What is less commonly remarked is
that the appellate case dialogue method also shares a common basis in standard
experiential learning techniques. Experiential learning occurs in a repetitive cycle
of (a) preparation for an experience, (b) performance in role, (c) reflection on
one’s performance, and (d) synthesis of the experience with existing knowledge
119
and other experience. In this process, the teacher is less focused on conveying
material than on coaching the student through the process of preparing for an
120
experience and reflecting on it. The cycle of preparing, doing, and reflecting
also trains entry-level professionals in habits of reflective practice needed for
121
continued professional growth throughout their careers.
Skills instruction assists the cycle of experiential learning by interposing
instruction that develops the concepts and theories underlying the skills being
taught, and provides reflective evaluation and feedback on the students’
122
performance. For example, in a clinic, students might be taught a conceptual
framework that breaks down the steps that lawyers go through in analyzing the
123
facts of a case and developing a fact investigation plan. Students then have an
opportunity to apply that framework to a clinic case they are working on, and to
reflect on the process in one-on-one supervision sessions and receive

116.
117.
118.
119.

LLEWELLYN REPORT, supra note 45, at 366–67.
Spencer, supra note 2, at 2058.
Spiegel, supra note 6, at 582–83; Spencer, supra note 2, at 1977.
J. P. OGILVY, LEARNING FROM PRACTICE: A PROFESSIONAL DEVELOPMENT TEXT FOR LEGAL
EXTERNS 3 (2d ed. 2007); Kenneth R. Kreiling, Clinical Education and Lawyer Competency: The Process of
Learning to Learn from Experience through Properly Structured Clinical Supervision, 40 MD. L. REV. 279, 285
(1981).
120. Richard K. Neumann, Jr., Donald Schön, The Reflective Practitioner, and the Comparative Failures
of Legal Education, 6 CLINCAL L. REV. 401, 415–17 (2000).
121. Id. at 404–12.
122. AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, SECTION OF LEGAL EDUCATION AND ADMISSIONS TO THE BAR,
REPORT OF THE TASK FORCE ON LAW SCHOOLS AND THE PROFESSION: NARROWING THE GAP, LEGAL
EDUCATION AND PROFESSIONAL DEVELOPMENT—AN EDUCATIONAL CONTINUUM 243 (1992) [hereinafter
MACCRATE REPORT].
123. See KRIEGER ET AL., supra note 53, at 149–57.
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individualized coaching that helps them through the process in the unstructured
124
setting of real practice.
The appellate case method employs similar experiential learning techniques
to teach legal analysis and reasoning by providing students with opportunities to
perform those skills, supported by in-class guidance and feedback from the
125
instructor. The Carnegie Foundation’s study of legal education describes how
professors in first-year law school courses instill the foundational skills of
“thinking like a lawyer” by using techniques of modeling, coaching, scaffolding,
126
and fading. In the case dialogue method, professors will model the correct way
to read a case by stating the relevant facts or holding of a case, and they will
coach by providing feedback that directs students to focus on the relevant
127
information. For students who are struggling, the professor will provide
scaffolding that makes more explicit the structural elements that the professor is
looking for, such as the holding of the case, the appellate court’s reasoning, and
128
the extension or modification of the holding to other similar factual situations.
And, as students gain mastery over the techniques of case analysis, the instructor
can fade, encouraging students to perform the skills of case analysis without
129
explicit guidance.
When considered as a form of experiential learning, the case dialogue
method falls short in a couple of aspects, neither of which is intrinsic to its
design. First, it is almost always carried out in large classroom settings, where the
professor calls on students one at a time, relying on other students to learn
130
vicariously from watching the interaction. The other is that professors who are
not sufficiently attuned to the skills development aspect of the case method
approach may rush through it in an attempt to cover more substantive material
131
and lose the focus on the techniques that they are teaching. However, when
well-executed in class sizes that allow for sufficient student participation and
interaction, the case dialogue method can fulfill its potential as experiential
132
education in foundational lawyering skills.
Once the case dialogue method’s pedagogical structure is revealed as
continuous with, rather than separate from, the pedagogy employed in teaching
other lawyering skills, the keys to unlocking an integrated law school curriculum

124. Peter Toll Hoffman, Clinical Course Design and the Supervisory Process, 1982 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 277,
279–81 (1982).
125. Shaw, supra note 30, at 1281–85.
126. CARNEGIE REPORT, supra note 3, at 61.
127. Id. at 61–62.
128. Id.
129. Id. at 60–63.
130. Michael Hunter Schwartz, Teaching Law by Design: How Learning Theory and Instructional Design
Can Inform and Reform Law Teaching, 38 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 347, 351 (2001).
131. See Petys, supra note 5, at 1274.
132. Shaw, supra note 30, at 1278–85.
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are in hand. Importantly, the recognition of a common pedagogical structure
breaks down the perceived divide between doctrinal teaching as primarily
theoretical and skills teaching as primarily practical, revealing both that
experiential learning techniques pervade the case dialogue method and that skills
133
instruction depends on teaching the conceptual theories underlying practice.
B. Theories of Practice: “Making the Invisible Visible”
Teaching lawyering skills is not simply a matter of sending students into
practice settings and expecting them to learn from experienced practitioners. As
Blackstone wrote in 1803, in his critique of the apprenticeship system, “if
practice be the whole [a student] is taught, practice must also be the whole he
will ever know: if he be uninstructed in the elements and first principles upon
which the rule of practice is founded, the least variation from established
134
precedents will totally distract and bewilder him.” As this quote suggests, a key
component of experiential education is articulating the theories underlying
practice, which are used to help students internalize what they absorb from
135
practice experiences and transfer it to other contexts.
The challenge, according to Donald Schön, one of the leading figures in the
136
theory of professional education, is to “solve the problem of describability, to
figure out how to describe what [professionals] are doing in a way that allows
137
other people also to learn.” The pedagogical techniques of the case dialogue
method have unlocked the “problem of describability” with respect to the skills
of legal analysis and reasoning by breaking down and articulating the steps
through which experienced lawyers extract the relevant rules from appellate
cases, “mak[ing] the invisible visible, both in the mind of the teacher and the
138
mind of the learner.”
In Llewellyn’s time, the conceptual theories underlying other lawyering
skills had yet to be articulated in ways that made them teachable. The “first great
and immediate need and opportunity of legal education today,” he wrote in 1944,
lies “in making their theory conscious and in giving elementary practice in their
139
use.” Llewellyn was hopeful that the mid-1940s would see growth in the

133. See generally Spiegel, supra note 6 (arguing that doctrinal instruction and clinical education are each
based in both theory and practice).
134. WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND sec. 1 (Lonang Institute 2005)
(1765–1769), available at http://www.lonang.com/exlibris/blackstone/bla-001.htm (on file with the McGeorge
Law Review) (emphasis added).
135. CARNEGIE REPORT, supra note 3, at 62; David A. Binder & Paul Bergman, Taking Lawyering Skills
Training Seriously, 10 CLIN. L. REV. 191, 199 (2003).
136. Neumann, supra note 120, at 401–03.
137. Donald A. Schön, Educating the Reflective Legal Practitioner, 2 CLINICAL L. REV. 231, 247 (1995).
138. CARNEGIE REPORT, supra note 3, at 59.
139. LLEWELLYN REPORT, supra note 45, at 217.
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theoretical conceptualization of a wider range of craft-skills, fueled by the return
to the legal academy of a generation of law teachers who had dispersed into
140
practice during World War II. During their wartime sabbaticals, law instructors
immersed themselves in law practice “with . . . teachers’ understanding of how
141
experience in practice can be organized for teaching,” making them ideally
suited, in Llewellyn’s eyes, to take on the project of re-inventing the law school
curriculum.
Llewellyn’s hope went largely unfulfilled in the post-War period, which saw
142
increasing standardization and curricular stagnation in legal education.
However, it gained traction a couple of decades later, when the Ford Foundation
poured money into the legal academy for the purpose of creating real-practice
143
legal clinics in law schools, and a generation of clinical teachers who remained
embedded in practice began to develop the conceptual frameworks for teaching
other lawyering skills. The articulation of the conceptual frameworks underlying
lawyering skills was the brainchild of Gary Bellow and Bea Moulton, who coauthored the seminal textbook in lawyering skills, The Lawyering Process:
144
Materials for Clinical Instruction in Advocacy. With the rapid growth of
clinical programs in law schools across the country, course materials for clinical
145
teaching were in high demand. Bellow and Moulton answered that demand
with a set of teaching materials that provided a breakdown, description, and
critical analysis of the lawyering process in terms of its discrete tasks and roles,
such as “interviewing, counseling, negotiat[ing], drafting, oral advocacy,” and
146
factual investigation. Bea Moulton has explained how she and Gary Bellow
explored the lawyering process from scratch, breaking down the tasks in which
lawyers engaged into their component parts. They also researched materials
from other disciplines—psychology, sociology, decision theory, probability

140. Id. at 364–65.
141. Id. at 365 (emphasis in original).
142. STEVENS, supra note 18 at 205–31.
143. Between 1968 and 1978, the Ford Foundation granted $11 million to the Council on Legal Education
for Professional Responsibility (CLEPR) to provide support to clinical legal education programs. Margaret
Martin Barry, et al., Clinical Legal Education for This Millennium: The Third Wave, 7 CLINICAL L. REV. 1, 19
(2000). The Department of Education picked up where the Ford Foundation left off and appropriated in excess
of $87 million to fund clinical legal education programs from 1978 to 1997.
144. For a description of the importance and impact of this early textbook, see Susan Bryant & Elliott S.
Milstein, Reflections upon the 25th Anniversary of The Lawyering Process: An Introduction to the Symposium,
10 CLINICAL L. REV. 1 (2003).
145. Michael Meltsner, Celebrating The Lawyering Process, 10 CLINICAL L. REV. 327, 327 (2003); Bea
Moulton, In Memoriam: Gary Bellow, 114 HARV. L. REV. 416, 420 (2000) (“Clinicians were starting from
scratch in school after school, helping students represent thousands and thousands of poor people. They needed
a book.”).
146. Gary Bellow & Earl Johnson, Reflections on the University of Southern California Clinical
Semester, 44 S. CAL. L. REV. 664, 673 (1971).
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analysis, game theory—that would bring theoretical perspective and critical
147
depth to the analysis of basic lawyering tasks.
148
As lawyering skills instruction has expanded and matured over the years,
the raw material now exists for teaching the analytical frameworks for a broad
149
range of “fundamental lawyering skills.” The skills identified in the early
150
clinical teaching materials focused on the litigation context. However, a
growing number of law professors are now developing similar vocabularies of
151
practice in the transactional context as well. As these transactional law teachers
articulate the conceptual and analytical frameworks that underlie transactional
practice, they are developing useful teaching materials for others that can be used
152
in transactional skills instruction.
C. Collaboration Between Academics and Practitioners
The development of a robust analytical literature on the conceptual basis and
underlying theory of lawyering skills makes it possible to implement, in concrete
terms, what Karl Llewellyn could only imagine: a well-balanced law school
153
curriculum organized around acquiring the “craft-skills” of lawyers. However,
there remains the question of how best to implement this ideal. As commentators
note with dismay, law faculties are dominated by professors with little practice
154
experience upon which to draw in teaching a broader range of lawyering skills.
One tempting solution is to abjure responsibility and delegate the job to adjunct
professors on the theory that they are better situated to teach the practice of law.
155
However, the “farming out” model of skills instruction is also unsatisfactory.
The central dilemma of professional skills instruction is that, while experienced
practitioners have high levels of professional experience and competence, they

147. Bea Moulton, Looking Back at The Lawyering Process, 10 CLIN. L. REV. 33, 50–51 (2003);
Moulton, supra note 131, at 419.
148. See generally Carrie Menkel-Meadow, The Legacy of Clinical Education, 29 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 555
th
(1980) (examining various theories behind and approaches to lawyering); see also Symposium: The 25
Anniversary of Gary Bellow’s and Bea Moulton’s The Lawyering Process, 10 CLINICAL L. REV. 1, et seq.
(2003) (discussing different approaches to lawyering through a symposium of clinical textbooks authors).
149. MACCRATE REPORT, supra note 122, at 138–41.
150. Moulton, supra note 147, at 35.
151. See, e.g., Stark, supra note 91; Karl S. Okamoto, Teaching Transactional Lawyering, 1 DREXEL L.
REV. 69 (2009); Fleischer, supra note 89.
152. Stark, supra note 91, at 229–31 (extracting certain commonly recurring issues—money, risk,
control, standards, and endgame—that she used to formulate a “five-prong framework” for teaching law
students how to analyze business issues that might arise in a deal); Fleischer, supra note 89, at 483–90
(discussing an adaptation of Gilson’s “transaction cost engineering” model for use in skills courses on dealmaking).
153. See, e.g., Fleischer, supra note 89, at 491.
154. Newton, supra note 4, at 112; Fleischer, supra note 89, at 479.
155. LLEWELLYN REPORT, supra note 45, at 365.

28

01_KRUSE_VER_01_6-18-13_FINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

1/31/2014 9:52 AM

McGeorge Law Review / Vol. 45
do not necessarily have the ability to translate this expertise into “teachable
156
experience and competence.”
Cognitive psychologists explain why it is difficult for an expert practitioner
to articulate the underlying analytical frameworks of practice into a conceptual
157
vocabulary that makes them teachable and transferable. In the process of
developing expertise, professionals internalize simplified schemas for structuring
158
relevant information. When confronted with a new problem, experts draw on
these internalized schemas to hone in on the relevant facts, analyze the problem
according to its deep structure, and formulate solutions based on previous
159
experience with structurally similar problems. Professionals’ tacit knowledge is
exhibited by competent behavior, but not necessarily accurately described by
160
those who exhibit it. An expert problem-solver will move through the
intermediate steps of reasoning so automatically and unconsciously that the
161
process will seem intuitive. Those who are good at what they do are not
necessarily the best teachers. The best teachers are those who can explain what
they are doing by breaking good practice down into its elemental steps and
162
articulating the theories underlying that practice.
It requires sustained intellectual work at the intersection of theory and
practice to bring to the surface the structures that underlie expert practice and to
articulate them into frameworks that are useful for teaching. When Bellow and
Moulton began the project of developing teaching materials for clinical
instruction, they found that existing literature on law practice—which “took a
163
strong ‘this is the way to do it’ perspective”—was not going to be much help.
As Moulton later put it, “most of us in those days had no framework or
vocabulary for describing what the task involved, and how to get better at it. We
just did it, perhaps imitating whatever senior lawyers we had been fortunate
164
enough to be around.” More recently, in developing materials for teaching a
new set of transactional skills, the new theorists of transactional practice have
165
found existing practice-based materials unhelpful. As Victor Fleischer wrote, to
be useful as teaching materials, there needs to be a conceptual framework and
“[t]o the extent transaction-oriented teaching materials exist[ed] at all, they
156. LLEWELLYN REPORT, supra note 45, at 365.
157. Stefan H. Krieger, Domain Knowledge and the Teaching of Creative Problem Solving, 11 CLINICAL
L. REV. 149, 167 (2004).
158. Id.; STEPHEN ELLMAN ET AL., LAWYERS AND CLIENTS: CRITICAL ISSUES IN INTERVIEWING AND
COUNSELING 353 (2009).
159. Krieger, supra note 157, at 168; Ian Weinstein, Lawyering in the State of Nature: Instinct and
Automaticity in Legal Problem Solving, 23 VT. L. REV. 1, 24–26 (1998).
160. Schön, supra note 137, at 243.
161. ELLMANN ET AL., supra note 158, at 351; Weinstein, supra note 159, at 26.
162. Shaw, supra note 30, at 1298.
163. Moulton, supra note 147, at 50; Bellow & Johnson, supra note 146, at 673.
164. Moulton, supra note 147, at 46.
165. See Fleischer, supra note 89, at 479; Stark, supra note 91, at 228.
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166

tend[ed] to resemble a cookbook.” When Tina Stark did an informal survey of
law partners, asking them how they identified business issues that would “add
value to the deal,” she got answers like it “requires a sixth sense,” or “[y]ou
167
know one when you see one.”
This is not to say that adjunct professors are incapable of developing skills
courses that articulate and teach the conceptual frameworks underlying good
practice; however, it is a mistake for academic law professors to simply assume
that if they farm their students out to experienced practitioners, experiential
learning will necessarily occur. Clinical professors, who remain engaged in
active practice from within the walls of the academy, are ideally situated to
articulate the conceptual frameworks underlying good practice; and the presence
of active practitioners in the profession of teaching has done much to advance the
168
development of teaching materials for a wide range of lawyering skills.
However, the artificially low caseloads in clinic teaching eventually distance
169
clinical professors from the rhythms and approaches of practicing lawyers.
A well-balanced curriculum is more likely to emerge from a series of
collaborations between faculty members whose primary engagement in teaching
brings a focus on the kinds of conceptual structures that are helpful to student
learning and experienced lawyers who can provide perspective on what
170
practicing lawyers do. Some of the recent innovations in teaching transactional
lawyering involve such collaborations, where students learn and apply the
conceptual frameworks of deals and deal-making under the direction of law
school faculty members and practicing lawyers share their perspectives or
171
demonstrate their approaches to the same material.
D. Progression of Skills Development: Simulations, Clinics, and Externships
In addition to covering a broader range of lawyering skills, a well-balanced
law school curriculum must recognize the unique values of different types of
experiential education and use them to structure a progression of learning

166. Fleischer, supra note 89, at 479.
167. Stark, supra note 91, at 228. Karl Okamoto got similar answers over years of informally asking deal
lawyers what makes someone great at their craft. Okamoto, supra note 151, at 70–71.
168. Stacy Caplow, A Year in Practice: The Journal of a Reflective Clinician, 3 Clin. L. Rev. 1, 2-3
(1996).
169. Id.
170. See e.g., Fleischer, supra note 89.
171. See e.g., id. at 491–92 (stating that in the first half of the author’s Deals class, students learn the
conceptual frameworks for deal-making and in the second half they study actual deals by analyzing them and
then hearing from the lawyers or principals involved in the deal they just analyzed); Illig, supra note 88, at 234–
37 (describing Transactional Practice Labs that are taught by adjunct professors and appended to substantive
law courses); Okamoto, supra note 151, at 87–90 (describing a Transactional Lawyering course where
professors taught conceptual frameworks for student simulations and then practicing lawyers provided
demonstrations of how they would approach the same simulated exercises).
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experiences that increases in challenge and complexity. The common practice
in legal education has been to structure the first year of law school with a
uniform slate of required courses and then to leave second and third year students
largely on their own to fill out the balance of their credits from among a wide
173
array of electives with little or no guidance. As Brent Newton put it, “[a]fter
completing their mandatory courses, law students at many schools are left at sea
174
in choosing and scheduling courses.” “Often students end up taking a
175
somewhat random combination of courses . . . .”
Although the American Bar Association now requires all law students to
176
complete a minimal amount of professional skills training, efforts to remediate
the skills deficit in legal education often fall into a common error of lumping
together all types of experiential education. For example, the American Bar
Association is considering changes to its accreditation standards for law schools
that would require all law graduates to complete at least six credits in “one or
more experiential course(s)” that “must be: (i) simulation course(s); or (ii) faculty
177
supervised clinical course(s); or (iii) field placement(s).” This kind of
undifferentiated skills requirement treats as interchangeable what are actually
three distinctive and complementary pedagogical methods used in experiential
178
education.
Simulations are the simplest form of experiential learning and have the
benefit of permitting instructors to isolate the particular skill or skills being

172. See ABA SECTION OF LEGAL EDUCATION AND ADMISSIONS TO THE BAR, A SURVEY OF LAW
SCHOOL CURRICULA: 1992-2002 13-16 (2004), available at http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/
aba/migrated/legaled/ publications/curriculumsurvey/Curriculum_Survey.authcheckdam.pdf [hereinafter ABA
2002 Curriculum Study] (on file with the McGeorge Law Review).
173. The trend toward unstructured electives in the upper levels of law school has been increasing. See
ABA Curriculum Study, supra note 172; ABA SECTION OF LEGAL EDUCATION AND ADMISSIONS TO THE BAR,
SURVEY OF LAW SCHOOL CURRICULA: 2001-2010, Executive Summary 15-16 (2012), available at http://www.
abanow.org/wordpress/wp-content/files_flutter/1341346391LawSchoolCurriculaSurveyExecSummary.pdf
[hereinafter Executive Summary of ABA 2012 Curriculum Study] (on file with the McGeorge Law Review).
174. Newton, supra note 4, at 87.
175. Id.
176. The current standard requires “substantial instruction” in “other professional skills generally
regarded as necessary for effective and responsible participation in the legal profession.” ABA STANDARDS FOR
ACCREDITATION OF LAW SCHOOLS 2012–2013, Standard 302(4), available at http://www.americanbar.org/
groups/legal_education/resources/standards.html. However, the ABA interprets “substantial” has been
interpreted to mean that the skills instruction must “engage each student in skills performances that are assessed
by the instructor” rather than a particular number of credits. ABA STANDARDS FOR ACCREDITATION OF LAW
SCHOOLS 2012–2013, Interpretation 302-3, available at http://www.americanbar.org/groups/legal_education/
resources/standards.html (on file with the McGeorge Law Review).
177. ABA STANDARDS REVIEW COMM., April ‘13 SRC Meeting Materials 54 (April 2013), 54 (April
2013),
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/migrated/2011_build/legal_education/committees/standards_
review_documents/april_2013/2013_apr_src_meeting_agenda_and_drafts.authcheckdam.pdf (on file with the McGeorge
Law Review).
178. Roy Stuckey, Teaching with Purpose: Defining and Achieving Desired Outcomes in Clinical Law
Courses, 13 CLINICAL L. REV. 807, 812 (2007).
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taught. In simulations, students “perform law-related tasks in hypothetical
situations,”—role-playing interactions like a client interview or witness
examination and working with documents that might be found in a lawyer’s case
180
file. Although teaching with simulations is similar to using problems in
classroom instruction, simulations are more elaborate than problems, which are
181
used primarily to illustrate issues of law rather than to teach professional skills.
Some simulation courses focus on the repetition of a particular skill or set of
skills, such as a course on trial advocacy, client interviewing and counseling, or
negotiation; others focus on a particular lawyering task, such as deal-making,
where students engage in a series of exercises that take a deal from beginning to
182
end.
Simulations necessarily simplify the factual and interpersonal complexity of
actual lawyering, permitting the instructor to hone in on improving performance
183
of the particular skills that are the target of the instruction. In the process, it
omits other skills that are interconnected in the practice of law. For example, a
course in Trial Advocacy will focus on developing a case theory, presenting
evidence, examining witnesses, and making opening and closing statements, but
it will not teach students how to investigate the facts that come out in trial or
role-play the lawyers’ meetings with the clients. A course on Interviewing and
Counseling will focus on the interactions between the lawyer and the client and
teach techniques for gathering information from clients and assisting clients in
their decision-making processes. However, it will focus on these skills outside of
the larger context of legal research, factual investigation, and dispute resolution
184
that shape the lawyer’s advice to clients.
In clinics, students are given primary responsibility for practicing law under
185
the direct supervision of faculty members. In-house clinics are taught in the
context of a law office created within the law school to provide students with the
186
opportunity to practice law under the supervision of faculty members. Unlike
simulations, where other students or actors play pre-determined roles, clinic
students confront the complexities of real-life interactions with clients and other
187
participants in the legal system and perform professional skills in unstructured
179.
180.
181.
182.

See generally BEST PRACTICES REPORT, supra note 3, at 181.
Stuckey, supra note 178; see also BEST PRACTICES REPORT, supra note 3, at 179–80.
Gouvin, supra note 90, at 442.
Jay M. Feinman, Simulations: An Introduction, 45 J. LEGAL EDUC. 469, 470 (1995); BEST
PRACTICES REPORT, supra note 3, at 179–80.
183. Gouvin, supra note 90, at 442.
184. Id.
185. Report of the Committee on the Future of the In-House Clinic, 42 J. LEGAL EDUC. 508, 511 (1992)
[hereinafter Report on the In-House Clinic]; BEST PRACTICES REPORT, supra note 3, at 188–89; Elliott Milstein,
Clinical Legal Education in the United States: In-House Clinics, Externships, and Simulations, 51 J. LEGAL
EDUC. 375, 376 (2001).
186. Milstein, supra note 185, at 376.
187. Report on the In-House Clinic, supra note 185, at 511.
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settings where the facts are often unclear, inconsistent, and ambiguous.
Moreover, clinics provide the unparalleled opportunity to integrate legal
knowledge, factual uncertainty, interpersonal relationships, and ethical
189
challenges arising in real practice settings.
Although the core of the clinical experience is the student’s assumption of
190
the lawyering role in real cases or matters, clinic teaching involves a
combination of other methods to support learning in that role: classroom
191
instruction, supervision meetings, and case rounds. The classroom component
of clinic teaching permits group teaching of the conceptual theories underlying
practice, providing students with a vocabulary and framework for their real192
practice experiences. In supervision meetings with their professors, students
receive feedback on their work on clinic cases, debrief past events, and plan for
future events under sometimes intensive questioning designed to analyze possible
193
choices and uncover hidden assumptions. Case rounds provide an opportunity
for clinic students to work together to brainstorm a problem, debrief an
194
experience, or discuss common themes arising in their cases. Although clinic
casework is often unpredictable and the lawyering experiences may vary from
student to student, the small and intensive student-teacher relationships allow the
teacher to individualize and calibrate guidance and feedback to the individual
195
learning needs of the students.
In externships, students are placed in practice “settings external to the law
196
school,” such as law offices, public interest agencies, or judicial chambers.
Externship students might represent clients, appear in court, or complete research
and writing projects, and they get the opportunity to observe or assist lawyers or
197
judges in their day-to-day work. In the field placements, attorneys or judges
supervise the work of externs directly, with law school faculty providing a
supportive pedagogical role to help maximize the educational benefit of the
198
students’ field experiences. Externships often include a classroom component,
188. Id. at 512.
189. Karen Tokarz, et al., Legal Education and the Legal Profession in Crisis: The Need for a New Law
School Curriculum with Expanded Experiential Legal Education and Clinical Courses for All Law Students, 43
WASH. U.J.L. & POL’Y (forthcoming 2013).
190. Peter Toll Hoffman, Clinical Course Design and Supervisory Process, 1982 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 277, 283–
89 (1982).
191. Milstein, supra note 185, at 377.
192. Id. at 378; Kreiling, supra note 119, at 301–11.
193. See generally Peter Toll Hoffman, The Stages of the Clinical Supervisory Relationship, 4 ANTIOCH
L.J. 301 (1986) (describing the variety of methods used in clinical supervision and their usefulness in different
stages of the student’s progress in the clinic).
194. See generally Susan Bryant & Elliott S. Milstein, Rounds: A “Signature Pedagogy” for Clinical
Education?, 14 CLIN. L. REV. 195 (2007) (describing the purposes and methods of teaching in case rounds).
195. Quigley, supra note 51, at 488.
196. Milstein, supra note 185, at 376.
197. Stuckey, supra note 178, at 812.
198. Id. at 811–12.
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where students may explore issues relating to lawyering, such as the development
of professional identity or role, professional ethics, problem-solving, reflective
199
practice, or work-life balance. Externship students are usually also required to
200
set and periodically revisit specific learning goals for themselves, and to keep a
201
journal or do other reflective writing. The unique benefits of externship
experiences are their authenticity; externships expose students to the practice of
law in settings “closely similar to the actual setting in which [the] knowledge
202
[they] acquire later will be used.” However, because externships rely on
practicing lawyers for the direct supervision of student legal work, they do not
offer the same intensive opportunities for close instructor feedback, reflection,
203
and analysis of the lawyering experience that clinics provide.
Rather than viewing these different types of experiential learning as
interchangeable, a well-balanced curriculum should move students through a
series of experiential learning opportunities that begin with explicit guidance in
structured environments like simulations and move into intensive coaching,
supervision, and feedback as students perform in unstructured real-practice
204
settings. However, a sensible progression through experiential learning does
not map neatly onto the three types of experiential courses because each type of
experiential learning provides within it a range of possibilities for less and more
205
challenging experiences. Simulations, for example, can range from simple
exercises allowing students to learn some basic information about the conceptual
framework for a skill and perform an isolated task to a complex, multi-part
extended experience that ranges over the course of an entire semester and
206
integrates several lawyering tasks and skills. Moreover, some types of legal
work, such as high-stakes financial transactions, are best suited to study in an
extended simulation format rather than a real-practice setting because “[n]o client
207
would entrust a multi-million dollar transaction to law students.”
Within the realm of supervised real-practice experience, Susan Brooks has
distinguished between two kinds of roles that a student might play: a “mentee”
relationship where they engage in supportive legal work as they shadow and
observe lawyers in practice, or a “first chair” role of representing clients directly

199. See generally, OGILVY, ET AL., supra note 119 (covering these among other topics in a general
textbook for use in conjunction with externships).
200. Id. at 11–14.
201. Id. at 199–203.
202. Id. at 3; BEST PRACTICES REPORT, supra note 3, at 198–99.
203. Report on the In-House Clinic, supra note 185, at 511.
204. Susan L. Brooks, Meeting the Professional Identity Challenge in Legal Education Through a
Relationship-Centered Experiential Curriculum, 41 U. BALT. L. REV. 395, 412–13 (2012).
205. See Gouvin, supra note 90, at 441-42;
206. See id. at 441–46 (describing a range of different approaches to using simulations to teach
transactional lawyering in doctrinal courses).
207. Fleischer, supra note 89, at 485–86.
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under supervision. Clinics will almost always place students in a “first-chair”
209
role, while most externships keep students within a “mentee” role. However,
when compared to externship placements in which students take on more “first
chair” responsibilities with less guidance and feedback, the low caseload and
close supervision of a clinic can serve as an intermediate and preparatory step.
Complicating the picture is the often forgotten fact that law students are
contemporaneously working at part-time and summer jobs, where they may be
placed in a range of practice settings providing them with both mentee and firstchair experiences.
To structure a progression of experiential learning into their curricula, law
schools have begun to orchestrate students’ movement through a series of
learning experiences that provide increasing levels of complexity with skills210
based course requirements. For example, schools are increasingly adding
courses to the first year that introduce basic aspects of lawyering skills as an
211
introduction to the lawyering process or the problem-solving role of lawyers.
Some schools have provided skills structure to the upper-levels of the curriculum
by requiring students to take a certain number of upper-level skills courses or
212
requiring every student to take a real-practice clinic or externship experience.
The most notable effort to structure these experiences into a progression—rather
than simply to require them—has been Washington & Lee’s introduction of an
“experiential third year” comprised of clinics, externships, and capstone courses
213
with extensive simulations.
These are all laudable efforts and can serve as models for innovation
elsewhere. But even well-intentioned law school faculties confront barriers as
they approach curricular reform, and these barriers may seem even more
214
daunting in current times of shrinking budgets and lower enrollments. The next
Part describes some strategies for overcoming these barriers by analyzing more
carefully the perceived costs of curricular innovation, and providing concrete
suggestions for change that are particularly suited to the environment of law
215
schools today.

208. Brooks, supra note 204, at 412–13.
209. Peter A. Joy, The Cost of Clinical Legal Education, 32 B.C. J. L. & SOC. JUSTICE 309, 322 (2012).
210. See infra Part III.B.1.
211. Id.
212. See Tokarz et al., supra note 189.
213. WASHINGTON & LEE UNIVERSITY NEW THIRD YEAR REFORM, http://www.law.wlu.edu/thirdyear/
(last visited June 11, 2013) (on file with the McGeorge Law Review). For a more in-depth discussion of
programs that require substantial skills instruction and clinics or externships, see Tokarz, et al, supra note 189.
214. See infra Part III.
215. Id.
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III. OVERCOMING THE BARRIERS TO INNOVATION IN THE LAW SCHOOL
CURRICULUM
When the issue of reforming the law school curriculum to include more
professional skills instruction is raised, it is often accompanied by an almost
immediate repetition of the mantra that such ideas are nice but the cost of
216
intensive, one-on-one supervision in experiential courses is prohibitively high.
In the current era of soaring tuition, a tightening job market, and declining
217
student enrollments, it is especially important to examine carefully how
curricular reform can occur in ways that are cost-sensitive. This Part will explore
the cost issue in more detail and offer suggestions for cost-sensitive re218
deployment of resources to further the ends of curricular reform.
A. Defining the Costs of Curricular Reform
1. Monetary Costs
The primary reason that experiential education is said to be too costly is that
quality instruction that supports experiential learning requires a low studentteacher ratio to permit multiple opportunities for performance, feedback, and
219
reflection. Law school clinics are probably the most expensive form of
experiential legal education in these terms, both because the student-teacher ratio
220
usually stays in the range of eight to one or ten to one, and because it takes the
dedicated attention of a full-time teacher to maintain the high level of supervision
221
of actual cases that clinic teaching demands. Externships require less
investment of faculty resources because volunteer attorney mentors directly
supervise the student work. However, to provide a sound pedagogical framework
for on-site learning, externships still require significant faculty investment in
one-on-one meetings with students, field supervisors, and other support for

216. See e.g,. Rakoff & Minow, supra note 36, at 603; Joy, supra note 209, at 309-10; Illig, supra note
88, at 231–32.
217. TAMANAHA, supra note 4, at 2–6.
218. See infra Part III.A.1.
219. See generally Gouvin, supra note 90, at 444.
220. Report on the In-House Clinic, supra note 185, at 538. More recent data indicates that average
student-teacher ratios fall within the range of five to eight students (40.9% of those surveyed) and nine to
twelve students (32.3% of those surveyed). DAVID A. SANTACROCE & ROBERT R. KUEHN, CENTER FOR THE
STUDY OF APPLIED LEGAL EDUCATION: THE 2010-11 SURVEY OF APPLIED LEGAL EDUCATION 16 (2012),
available at http://www.csale.org/files/CSALE.Report.on.2010-11.Survey.5.16.12.Revised.pdf (on file with the
McGeorge Law Review).
221. Report on the In-House Clinic, supra note 185, at 511 (“Although the clinical movement began with
practitioners used as supervisors, many clinical teachers came to believe that student supervision by
practitioners was problematic for a methodology in which teaching was not incidental to the enterprise but
rather its primary function.”).
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feedback and reflection. According to one set of guidelines, the appropriate
student-faculty ratio in externships should be no more than sixteen to one if
223
taught in a seminar format and ten to one if taught through individual tutorials.
Simulations are similarly structured to permit students to perform in role and
receive individualized feedback, similarly limiting the size to which they can
224
grow.
It makes sense, in terms of simple math, to say that if a greater percentage of
a law school’s curriculum is to be delivered in settings with lower student-teacher
ratios, law school education will cost more. However, this “simple math”
reasoning overlooks the realities associated with the costs of legal education; and
in so doing, it overlooks opportunities for expanding experiential education in
ways that are cost-sensitive.
First, the argument overlooks the most basic question: more expensive
compared to what? Lower student-teacher ratios improve the quality of student
225
engagement and learning across the board, including in doctrinal courses.
Indeed, one of the major drawbacks of the case method approach is its reliance
on self-directed, vicarious learning by the majority of students in a classroom,
226
while the professor engages a few students in intensive, one-on-one exchanges.
The pedagogical objectives of the case dialogue method are also better achieved
when the class size is small enough to permit the professor to call on students
multiple times throughout the semester and engage a larger percentage of the
227
class in structured, give-and-take discussions.
Second, as Peter Joy recently described, the cost of lower student-teacher
ratios must be put into context by noting the other costs that have driven up the
228
sticker price of legal education in recent times. Although law schools’
investment in smaller-enrollment experiential courses has been one factor driving
229
the increase, it is surpassed by other categories of expenditure. Most notably, in
recent years, law school faculty members have earned steadily more money to
230
teach a steadily decreasing average course load. Indeed, Robert Kuehn’s recent

222. See e.g. Laurie Barron, Learning How to Learn: Carnegie’s Third Apprenticeship, 18 CLINICAL L.
REV. 101 (2011) (describing the development of an on-site mid-semester meeting process).
223. J.P. Ogilvy, Guidelines for the Evaluation of Legal Externship Programs, 38 GONZ. L. REV. 155,
165 (2003).
224. Gouvin, supra note 90, at 443–44.
225. Schwartz, supra note 130, at 351–52.
226. Id.
227. Newton, supra note 4, at 101–02.
228. Joy, supra note 209, at 311 (describing rising tuition costs over the past three decades that
significantly outpace inflation).
229. Id. at 315–18 (noting the costs of building renovation and construction and of increases in average
faculty salaries).
230. Id. at 316–18. Moreover, increases in tuition during the boom years have not always been
attributable to actual costs: some schools drive tuition costs up simply because they can and because it enhances
their prestige to do so. Id. at 311–13.
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study of the “pricing” of clinical legal education suggests that there is no
relationship between a school’s choice to require or guarantee a clinic to every
231
student and its tuition.
Low student-teacher ratios remain a legitimate cost factor to consider, but the
“silver lining” in the cloud of precipitously-dropping law school enrollments is
232
overall student-faculty ratios have been in sharp decline. If law schools have
the authority to lay faculty off in proportion to the reductions in their tuition
revenues, overall student-teacher ratios could remain constant, but tenure and
233
other forms of security of position limit these choices. As a result, schools that
have secured the faculty positions of clinical teachers in boom years of student
enrollments will suddenly find they are now able to accommodate a larger
percentage of their student body in their existing clinics and externship
234
programs. And, student-faculty ratios in other upper-level elective courses are
likely to drop, permitting greater incorporation of experiential teaching methods
235
into those courses as well. The biggest threat to the quality of experiential
educational programs is that the faculty who teach them may be particularly
vulnerable to layoffs, compared with their colleagues who teach in the
236
classroom.
The monetary cost of experiential education, while not imaginary, has always
been questionable as the primary justification for holding back on curricular
237
reform. When considered in the context of other cost-drivers of legal education,
the choice not to develop a robust experiential program appears to be more a
question of priority than necessity. However, in the new environment of legal
education, the monetary cost barriers to curricular reform are fast fading into the
background; in many ways, the time has never been better for schools to offer
experiential education to their students. However, to do so, law schools must be
creative in redeploying the relative surplus in faculty-teaching resources that
238
many will likely be experiencing in the next few years.
231. Robert R. Kuehn, Pricing Clinical Legal Education, available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstract_id=2318042 (last visited Oct. 25, 2013) (on file with the McGeorge Law Review).
232. See TAMANAHA, supra note 4, at 2–6.
233. The ABA requires law schools to “afford to full-time clinical faculty members a form of security of
position reasonably similar to tenure.” ABA STANDARDS FOR THE ACCREDITATION OF LAW SCHOOLS, Standard
405(c) (2012).
234. See TAMANAHA, supra note 4, at 2–6.
235. See id.
236. Compliance and enforcement with the ABA standards governing the security of position of clinical
professors has been problematic. Recent survey data indicates that approximately 20% of faculty members
teaching in clinics are tenured and another 7% have clinical tenure. Another 17.5% have long-term contracts of
five years or more. For a more detailed description of the history and enforcement of this requirement, see Peter
A. Joy & Robert R. Kuehn, The Evolution of ABA Standards for Clinical Faculty, 75 TENN. L. REV. 183 (2008).
Given the history of enforcement, some schools will find themselves in the position of laying off the very
faculty members who are best qualified to be leaders in curricular reform due to economic necessity.
237. Joy, supra note 209, at 309–10.
238. A common objection at this point in the discussion is that faculty members simply lack the
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2. Other Costs
The prospect of redeploying existing faculty teaching resources away from
traditional doctrinal instruction and toward experiential education raises two
other kinds of cost issues. One is the cost to students of “spending” their
239
discretionary, upper-level law school credits on experiential instruction. The
other is the cost to faculty in terms of the time, effort, and imagination that it
takes to develop or redesign courses that integrate a broader range of professional
240
skills instruction and to learn to teach in new and unfamiliar ways.
To illustrate these costs to students in expending discretionary credits, I use
the example of my own experience at Hamline University School of Law.
Hamline recently adopted an experiential progression plan for integrating skills
instruction throughout the curriculum that will apply to students who enter in the
fall of 2014. Hamline had already recently developed a two-credit, first-year
lawyering course called Practice, Problem-Solving, and Professionalism, which
focuses on introducing students to lawyering skills, professional identity, and
professional role through a variety of assignments, exercises, interactions with
241
practicing attorneys, and simulated role-plays. The plan for experiential
progression was to build on this first-year introduction to skills by requiring
students to take two one-credit lawyering skills lab modules in the second year of
law school and twelve other credits in professional skills courses in the upperlevel curriculum. Hamline offers a wide range of skills courses, clinics, and
externships; and, with projected declines in student enrollment, offering enough
slots to meet these proposed requirements was not an issue. However, it quickly
became apparent that the proposed experiential requirements were on a collision
course with both core bar instruction and with students’ participation in some of

competencies to engage in instructional methods that deviate from the traditional case dialogue method.
However, I believe those who raise that objection overstate it for two reasons. First, as demonstrated in Parts I
and II, there are a lot of similarities in pedagogical structure between the case dialogue method and other skills
instruction, and there is reason to expect that faculties with competencies in one kind of skills instruction, a high
level of intelligence, and a proper grounding in the theories underlying other skills, can learn to adapt their
methods. Second, much of the frustration vented in the direction of law schools as a whole is based on a
stereotype of professors with PhDs and no practice experience and informed, if at all, by experience with elite
law schools. See, e.g., Harry T. Edwards, The Growing Disjunction Between Legal Education and the Legal
Profession, 91 MICH. L. REV. 34, 34–42 and n.15 (1992) (discussing complaints based on observations of
practices at elite law schools and a survey he circulated to his former clerks who had largely graduated from
these law schools). The applicability of these stereotypes to non-elite schools (or schools not striving to be elite
by replicating the hiring practices at elite schools) is questionable.
239. See generally Joy, supra note 209 (discussing the function and expenses related to clinical legal
training).
240. Id.
241. For a more lengthy description of the development and implementation of this course, see generally
Bobbi McAdoo et al., It’s Time to Get It Right: Problem-Solving in the First-Year Curriculum, 39 WASH. U. J.
L. & POL’Y 39 (2012).
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Hamline’s certificate programs in Health Law, Business Law, and Dispute
Resolution.
Hamline has a fairly typical law school curriculum that—like most schools—
242
requires instruction in the usual line-up of first-year subjects. The law school
requires upper level students to take a smattering of additional courses including
at least two credits of Professional Responsibility, International Law, and a two243
credit seminar. When students take the forty-two credits needed to meet
Hamline’s graduation requirements and add the thirty-eight credits it takes to
cover all thirteen of the non-required courses that teach subjects tested on the bar
examination, the total reaches eighty credits. Students who elect to take all of the
bar courses offered in the upper-level curriculum have only eight remaining
244
credits to spend. In the end, a significant core of the Hamline faculty was
unwilling to pass a set of course requirements that prevent students from taking
245
as many bar courses as they wanted to take and cut back on the number of
246
required credits, while retaining the overall progressive structure of the plan.
The Hamline experience drives home some of the deeper challenges
curricular innovation faces. Developing new and innovative experiential courses
and adding them as electives that students can choose is a good thing, and if law
schools build a robust skills and experiential program, at least some students will
247
take full advantage of it. But the traditional law school curriculum is set in its

242. Within the first two years, Hamline students are required to take: Contracts (6 credits); Torts I (3
credits); Civil Procedure (6 credits); Criminal Law (3 credits); Property (3 credits); Constitutional Law I (3
credits); Professional Responsibility (2 credits); Legal Research and Writing (5 credits in the first year and 2
credits thereafter); and International Law (3 credits). Graduation Requirements for JD, HAMLINE UNIV. SCH. OF
LAW (2013), http://law.hamline.edu/Content.aspx?id=2147503615 (on file with the McGeorge Law Review).
243. In the process of considering the experiential progression plan, the faculty also voted to amend the
International Law requirement to require that students complete at least two credits from a menu of courses that
expose students to law in a global context, some of which are skills or experiential courses.
244. An internal three-year study showed that Hamline students actually spent their discretionary credits a
number of different ways and their bar passage did not clearly correlate with their choices. About two-thirds of
the students elected to take in the range of seven to nine elective bar courses and a vast majority took at least
six. This data was based on Hamline students who took the Minnesota bar prior to Minnesota’s adoption of the
Uniform Bar Examination, when the total number of course needed to cover subjects tested on the bar was
eleven instead of thirteen. Memorandum from Kate Kruse and Bobbi McAdoo to the Faculty of Hamline
University, Experiential Progression Proposal (March 6, 2013) [hereinafter Memo to Faculty] (on file with the
McGeorge Law Review).
245. The situation was complicated by the fact that Minnesota had just adopted the Uniform Bar
Examination, which tested a different list of subjects that demanded an additional six credits of courses to
achieve full bar coverage. The certificate programs are also working to expand the experiential requirements
within the certificates so that students can meet an expanded skills requirement while completing a certificate.
246. Hamline ended up passing an Experiential Progression Plan that retained its progressive structure but
required fewer credits—one lab in the second year and six credits in the upper level—along with a commitment
to studying how bar instruction might be abridged or courses combined to lessen the total number of credits
needed to cover all the subjects tested on the bar.
247. For example, Hamline’s internal study showed that students elected an average of 9.77 credits in
skills courses at a time when Hamline required only two skills credits. However, the number of skills credits
that students elected were distributed along a range from one to twenty-eight credits: about 12% of the students
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ways. Structuring the curriculum to require all students to progress through a
series of experiential courses requires a broad, coordinated, and holistic approach
that re-shapes the curriculum to make room for students to meet experiential
requirements along with their other learning goals.
The next Section looks at a menu of relatively low-cost options that might be
part of such a curricular re-structuring. They are low-cost for faculty because,
while they require faculty to expend time and effort, learn new ways of teaching,
and collaborate with members of the practicing bar, they generally stay within
the skill sets that faculty members see as their strong suits: teaching, research,
248
and analysis. They are low-cost for students because they look, in part, at ways
of making core bar and other upper-level instruction more efficient so that it does
not have to be pitted against skills instruction. And, for law schools that already
have enough skills and real-practice experiential offerings in their curriculum to
fully serve the reduced class sizes of the next several years, they will be low in
249
monetary costs as well.
B. A Menu of Low-Cost Innovations to Implement the Goal of a Well-Balanced
Curriculum
Before turning to a specific menu of ideas, it is important to be reminded that
the end-game of a well-balanced curriculum aims at: (1) integrating substantive
law instruction into a broader range of skills instruction so that skills coverage
becomes a structuring criterion as important as doctrinal coverage; (2) creating a
progression of experiential learning that teaches the conceptual frameworks
underlying skills instruction in structured settings first and requires students to
perform lawyering tasks in increasingly unstructured settings; and (3) is
characterized by collaboration between the legal academy and the practicing bar
that avoids “farming out” experiential learning to members of the practicing
250
bar.
This menu of ideas is not meant to constitute a comprehensive program of
legal education, nor to substitute for the process of developing one. And, it does
not attempt to state benchmarks for the number of credits that schools should
allocate to skills instruction in a well-balanced curriculum, another important

met the minimum requirement by taking one 2- or 3-credit class; about 15% took fifteen or more total credits;
and the rest fell somewhere in between with no discernable pattern of distribution. Bar passage did not correlate
with the number of skills credits that students elected. Memo to Faculty, supra note 244.
248. See Rakoff & Minow, supra note 36, at 605 (saying of the first-year problem-solving course at
Harvard that “distinctly legal capacities are engaged in the analysis of complex, rich factual descriptions of
problems and in the generation of alternative avenues for problem-solving”).
249. As noted previously, this will depend on law schools’ budget-cutting priorities and the extent to
which they have protected the job security of their clinic and other experiential teaching faculty. See supra note
236 and accompanying text.
250. See supra Part II.
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251

project being carried out by others. The proposals that follow should be seen as
a menu of tactics schools might use as part of a larger strategy to achieve a wellbalanced and well-integrated law school curriculum.
1. Incorporate Introductory Instruction to Lawyering Skills and
Competencies into the First Year of Law School
Many schools have already developed first-year courses or lawyering
programs introducing lawyering skills like client problem-solving. Harvard Law
School made a splash with the introduction of its first-year curriculum that uses
case studies and accompanying readings to focus on developing problem-solving
252
skills. New York University has an extensive and long-standing Lawyering
Program that uses simulations and exercises to integrate basic lawyering skills
253
instruction with legal research and writing. Many other schools have now
developed similar instruction dedicated to lawyering skills, sometimes in
254
conjunction with an expanded legal research and writing program.
Schools might also choose to incorporate introductory skills instruction into
the first year through a coordinated effort among first-year instructors to work
skills exercises into their classes. Because the first-year curriculum is structured
and uniform, it is possible for a school to identify in advance the four or five
skills it wants to introduce in the first year and to integrate a coordinated set of
exercises based on these skills into each first-year substantive law course. Either
method—stand-alone course or coordinated integration—would achieve the
benefit of helping first-year law students put their developing skills of legal
analysis and reasoning into the larger lawyering process.
2. Append Skills Labs to Core Bar Courses as Intermediate Skills Training
One of the best-received components of Hamline’s Experiential Progression
Plan was the recommendation that one-credit lab modules be appended to core
bar courses and that students be required to take at least one of these labs in their
255
second year of law school. The “lawyering skills lab” idea is based on the lab
251. Others have made the case for what a comprehensive reform should be. For example, in a recent
article, Karen Tokarz, Antoinette Sedillo Lopez, Peggy Maisel, and Robert F. Seibel recommend that every law
graduate should “complete a minimum of 21 credits in experiential courses over the three years of law school,
including at least five credits in law clinic or externship courses.” Tokarz, et al, supra note 189, at 2.
252. Rakoff & Minow, supra note 36 (describing the conceptualization of what has become Harvard Law
School’s first-year problem-solving workshop).
253. THE LAWYERING PROGRAM, http://www.law.nyu.edu/academics/lawyeringprogram/index.htm (last
visited June 11, 2013) (on file with the McGeorge Law Review).
254. See e.g. Nancy M. Maurer & Linda Fitts Mischler, Introduction to Lawyering: Teaching Students to
Think Like Professionals, 44 J. LEGAL EDUC. 96 (1994) (describing Albany’s program of integration with legal
writing); McAdoo et al, supra note 241 (describing Hamline’s program based on a problem-solving model).
255. See Memo to Faculty, supra note 244.
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structure of undergraduate science courses, where substantive material is taught
256
in large sections of classes and applied in smaller lab sections. Labs permit
students to get multiple experiences performing and receiving feedback on a
series of lawyering tasks in a way that is more directly integrated with the
257
concurrent substantive law instruction.
Labs can be offered relatively
inexpensively by using adjuncts to teach a one-credit lab module accompanying a
substantive law course. For that reason, labs costs are relatively inexpensive in
258
terms of asking faculty to teach outside their comfort zones. And, because they
are offered for low credit and concurrently with core bar instruction, labs are also
a low-cost option for students trying to balance competing demands on the
expenditure of their discretionary credits.
Some of the attractions of labs, however, also raise caution. The division of
responsibility between faculty-taught courses and adjunct-taught labs can slip
into a “farm out” model that reinforces the divide between theory and practice,
259
rather than integrating the students’ learning in the classroom and in the lab.
Delegating the development of a lab entirely to adjuncts without collaboration is
likely to result in a set of exercises teaching what lawyers practicing in the field
think students ought to know how to do—what Victor Fleischer called a
“cookbook” model of training in contrast to teaching the conceptual theories
260
underlying practice. A “farmed out” lab also runs the risk of undercutting the
authority of the classroom teacher with the message that in the lab you are going
to learn the way things “really work.”
The keys to success in the lab model are collaboration, communication, and
261
coordination. The professors who teach the courses need to be involved in
selecting exercises that will supplement and apply the substantive law instruction
in the underlying course and that fit best into an overall plan to create synergies
262
between the classroom and lab instruction. One way is to choose doctrinal
issues that students have difficulty grasping and might better understand through
263
application. If the labs are being developed as part of a systematic program,

256. Illig, supra note 88, at 234 (describing the University of Oregon’s Mergers & Acquisitions lab).
257. See id. at 234–35.
258. Id. at 236 (describing how Oregon asked law firms to “sponsor” labs instead of hiring individual
adjuncts).
259. Id. (“Our tenure track faculty are free to focus on their strengths—doctrine and policy—while
leaving the teaching of dealmaking to those with the best inside knowledge of the current norms and procedures
of practice.”).
260. Fleischer, supra note 89, at 479.
261. Illig, supra note 88, at 234.
262. Id.
263. For example, in developing a lab for an Evidence course I taught at the University of Nevada Las
Vegas, we focused one lab on the topic of “opening the door” to adverse character evidence in criminal cases,
which is much easier to grasp if you see how it plays out in application. The lab was also designed to teach
witness examination skills, but it did so in the context of helping students grasp a difficult doctrinal concept.
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such as Hamline’s lab requirement, they also need to fit into the comprehensive
264
plan for developing skills throughout the curriculum.
3. Offer Short Courses and Online Modules on Basic Bar Subjects
One of the most unfortunate ways that the traditional law school curriculum
creates barriers to students’ robust development of a broader range of
professional skills is by teaching upper-level bar courses exclusively or primarily
265
in large sections through the case dialogue method. As a result of this curricular
choice, students who want courses that cover the material tested on the bar
examination end up taking a high number of high-enrollment courses with a
repetitive instructional methodology, rather than branching out into smaller
classes providing more robust opportunities for performance and feedback and
development of a broader range of skills.
It is possible to address this concern by substantially integrating other skills
instruction into the organizing fabric of an upper-level bar course in the same
way that instruction in legal analysis and reasoning is built into the fabric of the
266
case dialogue method. In the world of low-cost options, it is also possible to
sever the coverage of core bar doctrine from the traditional classroom teaching
entirely and deliver some of that instruction in the format of smaller, lower-credit
modules. Many schools have opportunities for offering short courses in the
267
summer or in the interim between semesters that could be used for this purpose.
Advancements in technology also make it possible to create collections of
268
relatively short, focused pre-recorded “Ted Talks” on core bar subjects.
The availability of bar instruction in short modules gives students a lowercost option to gain a foundation in some of the subject matters tested on the bar
and to choose the more intensive and in-depth coverage of bar subjects in areas in

264. Hamline, for example, has an overall plan to develop skills sets in three areas—advocacy, client
problem-solving, and transactional planning—that begins in the first year with its problem-solving course and
ends with required credits of more advanced skills instruction. The University has designed the labs to be an
intermediate level of skills development. The first phase will develop lab modules that further develop
advocacy, client problem-solving and transactional skills in Evidence, Family Law, Wills and Trusts, Secured
Transactions, Criminal Procedure, and Torts II.
265. See generally Lewyellen, supra note 45 (discussing the traditional education methods of law
schools).
266. For an exemplary effort, see generally Carolyn Grose, Outcomes-Based Education One Course at a
Time: My Experiment with Wills and Trusts, 62 J. LEGAL EDUC. 336 (2012) (describing the systematic and
holistic restructuring of a large-enrollment bar course to integrate client interviewing, client counseling, and
storytelling skills and to integrate and balance that teaching with basic doctrinal coverage).
267. See SANTACROCE, supra note 220, at 28.
268. Classroom instructors could also use pre-recorded modules to free up time for more interactive
skills-based learning in class. See Michelle Pistone, Flipped Learning for Legal Education, BEST PRACTICES
FOR LEGAL EDUCATION (Apr. 25, 2013), http://bestpracticeslegaled.albanylawblogs.org/2013/04/25/flippedlearning-for-legal-education/ (on file with the McGeorge Law Review).
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269

which they expect to practice. As students exercise this option, the enrollment
in some core bar courses will diminish, paving the way for integrating more
270
interactive and skills-based instruction into those courses.
4. Ditch the Casebook in Upper-Level Electives
One of the professional skills most overlooked in legal education is the skill
of legal research. The ABA requires all law schools to provide instruction in
legal research, and basic legal research skills are a core component of most first271
year required legal research and writing courses. However, upper-level
doctrinal instruction continues to rely on casebooks collecting and delivering the
relevant substantive law to students within the covers of a single edited volume.
By ditching the casebook in upper-level courses and requiring students to
research and discover the relevant law as they learn it, law schools could do a
better job of moving students progressively toward entry-level competence in
272
legal research throughout the curriculum.
Advancements in technology make it possible to replace the printed
casebook with instructional materials that provide a platform for the basic
doctrine in a substantive area and structured portals through which students can
research relevant law. Teaching from materials that were structured research
portals rather than edited volumes would open up new possibilities of teaching
law as it is integrated in statutes, administrative regulations, and other materials.
Students could use such materials to do targeted research assignments outside of
class that begin with significant scaffolding that walks students through the
process of finding a particular kind of relevant authority, such as an
administrative regulation implementing a statute or an IRS opinion letter. As the
course progresses, the assignments could become progressively less structured so
that students would need to integrate the research strategies learned in earlier
273
class assignments to complete the later assignments. In the classroom,
professors could draw on many of the same pedagogical techniques they use in
the case dialogue method: modeling research techniques on computer screens in
front of the class, calling on students to inquire what answer a student found and
how he or she found it, and engaging other students to see if they found a
274
different answer, or found the same answer through a different route.
From the students’ perspective, ditching the casebook would reduce costs
because casebooks are an expensive way to access material, most of which is in
269.
270.
271.
272.
273.
schools).
274.

Stuckey, supra note 178, at 822–23.
Fleischer, supra note 89, at 479.
See ABA STANDARDS FOR ACCREDITATION, supra note 176.
Stuckey, supra note 178, at 822–23.
See Schwartz, supra note 130, at 379–82 (discussing a constructivist theory as applied to law
BEST PRACTICES REPORT, supra note 3, at 165.
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the public domain and available to them online. But ditching the traditional
casebook entirely is not cost-free to faculty because there currently does not exist
a wealth of alternative materials from which professors can draw. Developing
such teaching materials would require a substantial investment of time and
275
imagination. But the project of developing such materials is within the
strengths and competencies of most faculty members because legal research is
something in which law professors regularly engage. In developing casebooks,
law professors already research a field broadly and find the cases they want to
include in published casebook materials. It would not be a stretch for members of
the legal academy to develop materials designed to build students’ research
capacities.
Moreover, there are lower-cost ways of taking incremental steps toward the
goal, such as developing a set of progressive research assignments and exercises
in courses that rely on the casebook as the primary course material. By
developing exercises and assignments in subject areas that rely primarily on state
and local law, professors could demonstrate how substantive law develops in
context, rather than through a disjointed collection of materials from diverse
jurisdictions.
5. Incorporate Substantial Simulation-Based Teaching into Specialized
Upper-Level Electives
One innovation many schools have already developed is specialized upperlevel electives incorporating substantial and extensive simulations in advanced or
specialized areas. For example, the experiential third year at Washington & Lee
incorporates a large number of what it calls “practicums,” along with real276
practice experiential courses, such as clinics and externships. In practicums, the
focus is on applying the substantive law in a specialized area by engaging in
277
practice-based exercises.
275 See generally Grose, supra note 266 (describing her process in creating an outcomes-based course).
276. Washington & Lee School of Law, Third Year Component Descriptions, http://law.wlu.edu/third
year/page.asp?pageid=652 (last visited June 14, 2013) (on file with McGeorge Law Review).
277. For example, Washington & Lee describes its Entertainment Law Practicum by saying:
This course focuses on the practical elements of drafting and negotiating deals in the
entertainment industry. The course will introduce students to understanding deal structures and
terms, identifying issues and finding creating solutions to problems, negotiating on your
client’s behalf (with an emphasis on what’s important to your client, what isn’t, and why), and
drafting the necessary documents. In order to best simulate a real-world work environment,
students will be involved in two deals simultaneously, one in which they represent the “talent”
and one in which they represent the “corporate entity.” There will be a live, hands-on
negotiation element to the course, as well as a written element intended to mirror how deals are
done through drafting and revision of documents by e-mail. The instructor will also endeavor
to have guest “clients” come to class to provide students with a realistic experience in
addressing client needs and concerns, and giving the best advice (including advice that a client
may not want to hear).
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Such courses provide an opportunity to better incorporate the unique
278
perspectives of adjunct professors into the curriculum. Many schools already
employ adjunct professors to teach upper-level courses in specialized areas of
law where, as Robert Illig put it, “ongoing practice experience is highly valued
279
and appropriately skilled full-time faculty scarce.” Such courses are also
sometimes offered in areas of advanced or highly specialized areas of law that
280
are not tested on bar examinations, such as Sports Law or Entertainment Law.
Rather than asking adjunct professors to teach such specialized areas from
casebooks, law schools could take full advantage of adjunct professors’ in-depth
knowledge of practice by redeploying them to methods of teaching that are more
281
practice-based.
6. Look for Ways to Increase the Capacity of Clinic and Externship
Programs
No matter how creatively a law school reallocates its resources from
traditional classroom instruction into simulations, nothing substitutes for the
value of the real-practice experience students gain in law school clinics and
282
283
externships. Surveys of recent law graduates confirm this observation. Real
practice experiences provide opportunities to integrate theory, doctrine, practice,
procedure, skills, and ethics into unstructured settings that cannot be duplicated
284
in simulated materials. Although there is much to be gained by supplementing
or replacing some of the classroom focus on legal analysis and reasoning with
simulated lawyering exercises, it would be a mistake to deploy existing resources
away from real-practice experiences for this purpose. As long as a law school
does not cut back its real-practice opportunities, the recent trend of declining
student enrollments will necessarily increase the real-practice opportunities for
285
the students who remain.

Id.
278. Illig, supra note 88, at 236.
279. Id.
280. Fleischer, supra note 89, at 479.
281. Illig, supra note 88, at 223.
282. Joy, supra note 209, at 326; Tokarz, et al., supra note 189.
283. In a survey of new nonprofit and government lawyers, over 83% rated legal clinics as “very useful”
in preparing them for the practice of law, with externships/field placements rated as “very useful” by 72% and
skills courses by only 48%. NALP, 2011 SURVEY OF LAW SCHOOL EXPERIENTIAL OPPORTUNITIES AND
BENEFITS: RESPONSES FROM GOVERNMENT AND NONPROFIT LAWYERS 26 (2012). A survey of new associates
in private law firms reached similar results, with almost two-thirds (63%) rating legal clinics as “very useful,”
followed closely by externships/field placements (60%) and skills courses lagging far behind (38.5%). NALP,
2010 SURVEY OF LAW SCHOOL EXPERIENTIAL OPPORTUNITIES AND BENEFITS 26 (2011).
284. BEST PRACTICES REPORT, supra note 3, at 166–67.
285. See id. at 110.
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However, schools should also look at options for increasing the number of
slots available in clinic and externship programs without reducing the aspects of
these programs that make them especially pedagogically valuable. In clinics, the
limited student capacity is created by the intensive demands of individualized
286
student supervision as well as the demands of casework. Unlike a classroom
course, which can absorb additional students without substantially increasing the
workload of the professor, the individualized instruction of clinical pedagogy
requires a greater investment of instructional time for each student that is added
287
to a clinic course. Moreover, increasing the number of students in a clinic also
increases the number of clients or cases that the clinic professor must supervise,
and these cases might continue after a semester ends, making further demands on
clinic faculty time.
By employing a co-teaching model, clinic courses can expand their capacity
for individualized supervision through collaboration with adjunct professors or
288
non-clinic faculty who feel comfortable taking a rotation in an existing clinic.
Clinics can also expand their relative capacity by using “hybrid” models
combining closely-supervised work on small, individual cases with immersion in
289
real-practice settings outside the walls of the law school. Such hybrid
collaborations reduce the workload of individual clinic professors by reducing
290
the number of cases that the in-house component of the clinic must absorb.
They have the additional benefit of combining the unique strengths of clinics and
externships, providing students both the intensive and individualized supervision
available in clinics and the verisimilitude of externship placements in law office
291
settings.
A school may also divert some of its surplus faculty resources into realpractice experiential education by recruiting non-clinical professors to teach
292
small sections of students in its externship program. Unlike clinic teaching,
which requires direct supervision of students in the practice of law, externship
293
professors play a supportive pedagogical role. Effective externship teaching
requires professors to understand the theory behind reflective practice and to use
it to support the learning experiences students are having in their field
294
placements. In one-on-one consultations, externship professors help students
identify and figure out how to address problems or frustrations they are
experiencing in their placements. These are basic teaching skills that most law
286.
287.
288.
289.
290.
291.
292.
293.
294.
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school professors either already possess or can develop within the context of a
295
thoughtfully organized and well-supported externship program.
Externship teaching also has the benefit of putting faculty in regular contact
with members of the practicing bar who serve as field supervisors for the student
296
placements. Fostering such connections can help academic professors stay in
touch with developments in the practice of law and can also help build good
relationships between a law school and its alumni who serve as field supervisors
for externship placements.
IV. CONCLUSION
The short menu of suggestions offered here is only a start, but it is hopefully
the start to a larger dialogue of reform in legal education. Reform has long been
hampered by the myth that theory can be separated from practice and in
misconceptions about the nature of both doctrinal teaching and professional skills
training. It is time for legal education to break free of the limitations in this kind
of thinking. The first step is recognizing the substantial professional skills
component in the traditional appellate case method of instruction and the
substantial theoretical component in professional skills education. Once law
schools recognize the basic continuities in pedagogical structure with other forms
of experiential education, they can unlock a new world of possibilities for
developing and re-deploying existing resources of faculty time and money to
better educating law students for the practice of law.

295. See Schwartz, supra note 130, at 383–409.
296. Joy, supra note 209, at 321.
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